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OUTSIDER TRADING ON CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION-A BREACH IN-SEARCH OF A
DUTY
Roberta S. Karmel*
INTRODUCTION
Insider trading cases are a key part of the enforcement pro-
gram of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").1 Many
prosecutions of insider trading, however, do not involve true in-
sider trading. Rather, they involve trading by outsiders, that is,
persons who are not employed by the issuer whose securities are
traded, and who trade on nonpublic market information. A fre-
quent type of outsider trading is trading in anticipation of a tender
offer not yet announced. Because of the egregious facts underly-
ing these cases, the SEC has been able to prosecute hundreds of
cases without formulating a reasoned analysis of the legal and
policy issues involved. Also, despite the large number of articles
discussing insider trading, a general consensus among commenta-
tors has not developed as to why insider trading is unlawful.2
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I In 1995 the SEC prosecuted 45 insider trading cases out of 486 total enforcement
cases. See SEC ANN. REP. 1, 13 (1995). Over the past ten years, the SEC has brought
over 400 insider trading cases. See WILLIAM R. MCLUCAS & NANCY E. ALLIN, INSIDER
TRADING-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OUTLINE 1 (1997).
2 Articles on insider trading are too numerous to cite. Some of the more significant
articles are as follows: Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979); Dennis W. Carlton &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production
of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309; Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and
Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179 (1991). See also DONALD C.
LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION
(1991); HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966);
WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1996).
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The United States Supreme Court rejected some of the SEC's
early theories about insider trading, causing the government to in-
creasingly rely upon the misappropriation theory, especially in
prosecutions relating to tender offers.3 Although the Court re-
cently approved the misappropriation theory in United States v.
O'Hagan,4 it did not develop a broad doctrine or policy rationale
that will assist the lower courts in distinguishing between lawful
and unlawful outsider trading. Furthermore, while the SEC is now
free to prosecute misappropriation cases, it does not have a
framework for deciding whether to pursue traders on outside in-
formation in other factual situations. Therefore, a theoretical and
policy justification for the ban on insider trading remains neces-
sary.
Part I of this Article traces the development of the law pro-
hibiting trading on inside information in the United States. Part II
of this Article discusses the most common theories justifying the
ban on such trading, which are as follows: fairness, parity of in-
formation, fiduciary duty, misappropriation, efficiency, and prop-
erty rights. Part III then discusses the author's view that prohibi-
tions against trading on inside information should be justified as
necessary to enforce the mandatory disclosure provisions of the
securities laws but should extend no further. Also, this Part argues
that instead of trying to suppress the use of nonpublic information,
the SEC and other securities regulators should encourage more
rapid disclosure of material information. In this regard, perhaps
the SEC has been overly concerned about the welfare of securities
analysts and bidders in takeovers.
Often, the prosecution of traders on inside information by the
SEC has been pursued as an end in itself to rid Wall Street of such
flamboyant and controversial personalities as Ray Dirks and Mi-
chael Milken.' Also, the SEC has utilized insider trading scandals
to expand its reach into cases involving misconduct by securities
attorneys and other finance professionals.' Yet, market profes-
3 See infra Part II.C-.D.
4 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
5 See generally CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL (1989); RAY L. DIRKS &
LEONARD GROSS, THE GREAT WALL STREET SCANDAL (1974); JESSE KORNBLUTH,
HIGHLY CONFIDENT (1992).
6 Attorneys, more than any other group, have been prosecuted for insider trading.
These cases include the notorious "Yuppie Five" scandal and the prosecutions of Ilan
Reich and Carlo Florentino, partners of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Israel Gross-
man, associate at Kramer, Levin, Nessin, Kamin & Frankel; and Kenneth Rubinstein of
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. See Donald Baer, A Yuppie Fable, AM. LAW.,
July-Aug. 1986, at 114; Bryan Burrough, Fates Are Disparate for Those Charged with In-
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sionals who enjoy time and place advantages with respect to mar-
ket information do not owe a general duty to investors and there-
fore are not inhibited from profiting from market information to
the fullest extent possible.' The failure of securities regulators and
courts to highlight this principle and articulate when, and why, in-
siders, their tippees, and other professionals do owe a duty to re-
frain from taking advantage of market information has maintained
the continuing confusion concerning the parameters of the crime
of trading on inside information.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAW
A. Sources of U.S. Law on Insider Trading
There are four sources for the prohibitions against trading on
inside information under the United States federal securities laws.
They are: section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act")' and SEC Rule 10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5") thereun-
der;9 section 16 of the Exchange Act; ° section 14(e) of the Ex-
change Act1 and SEC Rule 14e-3 ("Rule 14e-3") thereunder;2 and
the statutory amendments to the Exchange Act passed in the 1980s
that increased the sanctions for insider trading violations.3 The
most important of these sources in the jurisprudence of insider
trading is Rule 10b-5 which makes it unlawful for any person in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security:
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to
sider Trading, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1987, at A22. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Insider Trading Under the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1
(1993); Simon M. Lorne & W. Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against Lawyers
Before the SEC, 50 BUS. LAW. 1293, 1313 (1995).
7 In scalping and front-running cases, both of which involve trading on nonpublic
market information, breach of a fiduciary duty to an investment advisory or broker-dealer
customer may be actionable. See infra Part II.G.
8 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
10 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
11 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3.
13 The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered subdivisions of 15 U.S.C. § 78); Insider Trading and Securi-
ties Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as
amended in scattered subdivisions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78, 80b-4a). This article does not dis-
cuss the prosecution of insider trading under the mail fraud or wire transfer statutory pro-
visions in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. These provisions have sometimes formed the basis for
insider trading violations. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); see also
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 733-60.
19981
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary to make the statements made ... not
misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
on any person. 4
Rule 10b-5 makes no reference to insiders. It simply prohibits cer-
tain fraudulent conduct by any person upon any other person. 5
The typical insider trading case involves silence. The com-
plete failure to disclose that a buyer or seller of securities is in pos-
session of material nonpublic information is not generally viewed
as a violation of subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5, which relates only to
the making of untrue or misleading statements." Rather, such in-
action can be interpreted as "a device, scheme or artifice to de-
fraud" in violation of subsection (a) or as an "act, practice or
course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit" upon a
third person in violation of subsection (c). Although Rule 10b-5
generally prohibits fraudulent and deceptive practices in the public
securities markets, it does not, however, extend so far as to outlaw
all breaches of fiduciary duty or overreaching."
The term inside information, initially meant nonpublic infor-
mation that concerns events or circumstances related to a com-
pany's assets or earning power that is known only to corporate
management and its confidants and that can reasonably be ex-
pected to materially affect the market price of the company's
stock.' Classic insider trading involves trading upon such informa-
tion by corporate directors, officers, employees, or their tippees.
However, a current definition is more expansive for it includes
"unlawful trading in securities, by persons who possess material
nonpublic information about the company whose shares are traded
or the market for its shares."' 9 This definition includes "market in-
formation," which is information about events or circumstances
14 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
15 See id.
16 Under an extreme version of the "fraud on the market theory," silence could be
misleading. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). There are many situations in
the business world where one party to a business transaction can take advantage of an-
other by remaining silent. In some contexts such silence is actionable, while in others it is
not. To some extent it depends upon whether the parties are dealing at arms length or
whether the silent party owes a fiduciary duty to the disadvantaged party. See Deborah A.
Demott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of Disclosure in Business
Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65 (1994).
17 See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
18 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
19 LANGEVOORT, supra note 2, at 5.
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that affect the market for a company's securities but does not af-
fect the company's assets or earning power.2 ° Market information
may be referred to as "outside information" because it relates to
activities generated by investors, traders, market makers, broker-
age firms, and others. Information concerning a tender offer is
market information, and Rule 14e-3 generally prohibits anyone
other than a bidder obtaining information about an unannounced
tender offer from trading on that information.2
B. Insider Trading as a Fraud Under Rule 10b-5
At common law, trading on inside information over a stock
exchange was not regarded as unlawful or a breach of fiduciary
duty by a director to a shareholder because directors were deemed
to owe fiduciary duties to their corporations, not individual share-
holders.2  However, the special facts doctrine articulated an af-
firmative duty to disclose material, nonpublic facts in face-to-face
dealings between an insider and a shareholder 3 These concepts
were carried over into private litigation through the anti-fraud
provisions. 24
The SEC broadened the scope of an insider's duty under Rule
10b-5 in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,2 an SEC administrative pro-
ceeding in which the director of an issuer, who was also a principal
of a brokerage firm, used undisclosed adverse information-the
issuer's decision to cut a dividend-to recommend and effect the
sale of securities for customers of the broker. In holding that this
was a violation of Rule 10b-5, the SEC stressed the existence of a
relationship affording access to inside information intended only
for a corporate purpose and the unfairness in allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without
disclosure.26
Shortly after Cady, Roberts, the Supreme Court in SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. , broadly endorsed the prin-
20 See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S.
222 (1980); Arthur Fleischer Jr. et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798,799 (1973).
21 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1998).
22 See Goodwin v. Aggasiz, 180 N.E. 659,660 (Mass. 1933).
23 See generally Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
24 See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Geller v. Trans-
america Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943).
25 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). An earlier section 21(a) report predated Rule 10b-5. See In re
Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
26 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 917-18.
27 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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ciple that a fiduciary in the possession of market information must
abstain from trading on such information. This case arose under
section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, an antifraud
provision worded very similarly to section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act ("section 10(b)"). 21 Capital Gains involved an effort by the
SEC to require registered investment advisers to disclose to their
clients the practice of purchasing shares of a security for their own
accounts shortly before recommending that security for long term
investment, and then immediately selling the shares at a profit
upon the rise in the market price following the recommendation.
The Court found that such undisclosed "scalping" was a "practice
which operates as a fraud or deceit" upon clients.29
The first major court case affirming the use of Rule 10b-5 in
actions against those who trade on undisclosed, material corporate
information was SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.30 In Texas Gulf
Sulfur, the SEC sought to enjoin an issuer, its officers, and em-
ployees from trading and tipping others to trade stock and options
where there was material, undisclosed information about a copper
strike in Canada. The Texas Gulf Sulphur decision was predicated
28 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1994) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to or
purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than
such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the ac-
count of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the com-
pletion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the
consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph (3)
shall not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such
broker or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such trans-
action;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, de-
ceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this para-
graph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably de-
signed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
29 Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 181. Investment advisers have a fiduciary relationship to
their clients, and therefore trading on market information ahead of client transactions
breaches a fiduciary duty to such clients. See id. In cases where no such fiduciary relation-
ship exists, it has been necessary to utilize other theories to charge antifraud violations.
See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affid in part by an equally
divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); cf. In re E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No.
25,887, [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303 (July 6, 1988).
30 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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on the theory that Rule 10b-5 is based on the justifiable expecta-
tion of the securities marketplace that investors trading on imper-
sonal exchanges should have relatively equal access to material in-
formation." The case reversed the common law rule that an action
by a stockholder against a seller of securities cannot be predicated
upon mere silence even if the seller is a director of the issuer.32
In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the SEC argued, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit accepted, the theory that
the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act require a parity of
information among all traders in the public securities markets.
This did not mean that all investors should have precisely the same
information; rather, they should all enjoy access to the same in-
formation. Accordingly, an insider or his tippee who comes into
possession of confidential nonpublic information should disclose
that information or refrain from trading on it." There are two
problems with this argument. First, by stressing the obligation to
refrain from trading, it sanctions nondisclosure rather than man-
dating prompt disclosure.34 Second, the parity of information the-
ory has not been accepted by the Supreme Court or the SEC itself.
The reason the parity of information theory was eventually
rejected was that it quickly became apparent that a theory man-
dating a seller of securities to either disclose any material informa-
tion about securities known to the seller, but not generally known
to the marketplace, or to abstain from trading, was much too
broad. It also became apparent that security analysts and other
market professionals whose job it was to ferret out information
about securities should be given the opportunity to trade on such
information because permitting such trading would provide an in-
centive for better disclosure about, and more efficient pricing of,
securities. Furthermore, in situations involving market informa-
tion, rather than inside corporate information, a blanket prohibi-
tion against trading on information, not known throughout the
markets, would impede market liquidity. Accordingly, the law on
31 See id. at 848.
32 See id.
33 See id. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, a corporate officer denied the existence of merger
negotiations when his corporation was conducting such negotiations. 485 U.S. 646 (1983).
Neither he nor his company had engaged in trading the company's stock. The Court's
opinion broadly affirmed the case against a person who was neither a purchaser nor seller,
as well as the definition of materiality enunciated in Texas Gulf Sulphur, thus giving new
life to Texas Gulf Sulphur as an important precedent under Rule 10b-5.
34 See BERNHARD BERGMANS, INSIDE INFORMATION AND SECURITIES TRADING: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LIABILITY IN THE U.S.A. AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 54-57 (1991).
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inside information proceeded to balance a policy favoring fairness
to investors in general with legitimate business needs in keeping
information confidential or in permitting professionals to trade on
information not obtained through improper or surreptitious
means. Left open was the question of when outsiders could trade
on material, undisclosed corporate or market information.
Differences in opinion at the SEC as to a theoretical basis for
insider trading bans that was narrower than the one articulated in
Cady, Roberts arose in Investors Management Co. 35 This adminis-
trative proceeding was brought against investment advisers and
mutual funds that sold stock in McDonnell Douglas Corporation,
as the result of selective disclosure to institutional investors of
nonpublic adverse information by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith 6.3  The SEC opinion set forth the doctrine that one who ob-
tains material, nonpublic corporate information, which he has rea-
son to know emanates from a corporate source and which by itself
places him in a position superior to other investors, and thereby,
with respect to that information, falls within the purview and re-
straints of the antifraud provisions. In a concurring opinion,
Commissioner Smith posited the view that tippee responsibility
must be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary find-
ing that the tippee knew the information was given in breach of a
duty by one having a special relationship to the issuer and an obli-
gation not to disclose the information. 37 Further, the information
must be shown not only to be material and nonpublic, but to have
substantially contributed to the resulting trading.
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court limited the scope of in-
sider trading violations in Chiarella v. United States.39 This case in-
volved a printer who learned about upcoming tender offers to pur-
chase stock in target companies. The Court held that silence in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities may operate as a
fraud only if liability is premised on a duty to disclose, arising out
of a relationship of trust and confidence, not merely on one's abil-
35 Exchange Act Release No. 9267, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,163 (July 29,1971).
36 Merrill Lynch had learned of this information in its role as underwriter of McDon-
nell Douglas debentures. In a separate proceeding, Merrill Lynch consented to a sanction
and established a "Chinese Wall" between its investment banking and brokerage depart-
ments to prevent such misuse of inside information. See In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner, & Smith, 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968).
37 See Investors Management Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 80,523-24 (Smith, C., concurring).
38 See id.
39 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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ity to utilize information because of his position in the market-
place. The Court pointed out that, although the defendant's con-
duct may have been reprehensible, not every instance of financial
unfairness violates Rule 10b-5. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Burger set forth the view that anyone who misappropriates
material, nonpublic information in breach of an employment, fidu-
ciary, or similar duty and then trades on, or tips, that information
to his own advantage violates Rule 10b-5.40
Later, in Dirks v. SEC,4 the Supreme Court clarified its views
set forth in Chiarella by essentially adopting the rationale of
Commissioner Smith's concurring opinion in Investors Manage-
ment. In Dirks, a securities analyst and an officer of a broker-
dealer firm received information from a former officer of Equity
Funding Corporation of America to the effect that the corporation
was permeated with fraud. In the course of Dirks's futile effort to
publicize this information generally, institutions informed by Dirks
about the fraud sold Equity Funding stock. Dirks did not have a
client or fiduciary relationship with Equity Funding, nor did his
tipper breach a fiduciary duty to Equity Funding when he tipped
Dirks. Still, the SEC sanctioned Dirks, holding that when tippees,
regardless of their motivation or occupation, come into possession
of material information that they know is confidential and know,
or should have known, came from a corporate insider, they must
publicly disclose that information or otherwise refrain from trad-
ing.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's affirmation of
the SEC's opinion, holding that a duty to disclose arises from the
relationship between parties, not merely from a person's ability to
utilize information because of his market position.42 The Court
stated in dictum that under certain circumstances, such as where
corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter,
accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, out-
siders may become fiduciaries of the stockholders and, thus, be re-
garded as "temporary insiders. ' 43 However, the court stressed that
the basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such
persons have acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather
that they have entered into a special, confidential relationship and
40 See id. at 243, 245. The misappropriation theory was not, however, presented to the
jury.
41 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
42 See id. at 657-58.
43 Id. at 655 n.14.
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are given access to information solely for corporate purposes."
C. The Misappropriation and Remote Tippee Cases
After Chiarella and Dirks, the SEC and private plaintiffs had
difficulty prosecuting insider trading cases without alleging some
breach of a fiduciary duty. However, in cases involving trading on
market or tipped information, a fiduciary relationship was often
lacking. The charges in these cases were, therefore, based on ei-
ther the misappropriation theory articulated in Chief Justice
Berger's dissent in Chiarella,45 or the Court's dictum in Dirks stat-
ing that agents of a corporation may become "temporary insiders"
and therefore fiduciaries of the stockholders.4
These theories proved quite serviceable in numerous cases.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, 7 Third, s
Seventh,49 and Ninth 0 Circuits adopted the misappropriation the-
ory and applied it in a variety of fact patterns involving both tem-
porary insiders5 and the use of market information.12 The limita-
tions of these theories became apparent, however, even in the
Second Circuit, where the theory had been utilized in some mar-
ginal cases. 3 In United States v. Chestman 4 a husband tipped a
stockbroker concerning information-subsequently traded by the
stockbroker-that the husband had learned from his wife, who had
learned it from her mother, who had learned it from her brother, a
corporate insider. The court could find no fiduciary relationship in
this chain of tipsters that would make the husband culpable under
Rule 10b-5. The court held that kinship did not suffice and that
44 See id.
45 See supra text accompanying note 40; see infra text accompanying notes 152-53.
4 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. A wide variety of special relationships and tippees
have been implicated in insider trading cases. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at
283-344.
47 See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1993); United States
v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
48 See, e.g., Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd after re-
mand, 808 F.2d 252 (1986).
49 See, e.g., SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403,
408-09 (7th Cir. 1991).
s0 See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439,443-44 (9th Cir. 1990).
51 See, e.g., SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Teicher & Co., 785 F.
Supp. 1137, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), affd, 898 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1990).
52 See SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affid by an equally
divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
54 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
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the husband-defendant did not explicitly assume a duty of confi-
dentiality because of the information he received." A strongly
worded dissent criticized this opinion as drawing an unrealistic line
in leading to a perverse and circular result. 6
Moreover, in Carpenter v. United States," the Court shed
doubt on the continued application of Rule 10b-5 in preventing
outsiders from trading on material, nonpublic market information
even under the misappropriation theory. This case involved the
trading by a Wall Street Journal financial reporter in the stocks of
issuers scheduled to be written up in his "Heard on the Street"
column. The defendant's conviction on mail fraud charges was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court, but there was a four to four split,
with no opinion issued, on his securities fraud conviction. Further,
this case was unique in that the information was lawfully obtained.
In fact, according to the lower courts, the inside information he
"misappropriated" for personal profit was the Journal's publishing
schedule, not information specifically regarding the securities' is-
suers.
Despite its acceptance in four other circuits, the misappropria-
tion theory was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Bryan,59 a case involving cor-
ruption in the awarding of contracts by the Director of the West
Virginia Lottery ("Lottery"). In addition to the defendant's
fraudulent manipulation of two government contracts resulting in
his conviction on mail and wire fraud charges, the defendant used
confidential, nonpublic information in the purchase of securities of
companies doing business with the Lottery, resulting in his convic-
tion on securities fraud charges. The court upheld all charges ex-
cept the conviction under Rule 10b-5. The court held that criminal
liability under section 10(b) could not "be predicated upon the
mere misappropriation of information in breach of a fiduciary duty
owed to one who is neither a purchaser nor seller of securities, or
in any way connected with, or financially interested in an actual or
proposed purchase or sale of securities. ' 60
In United States v. O'Hagan, the Eighth Circuit joined the
Fourth Circuit in rejecting the misappropriation theory.6' This was
55 See id. at 567-68.
56 See id. at 580 (Winter, J., dissenting).
57 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
58 See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1027, 1031.
59 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
60 Id. at 952.
61 See 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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a much more conventional case involving trading in the securities
of a target company by an attorney representing the prospective
bidder. The Eighth Circuit took the position that the misappro-
priation theory conflicts with those Supreme Court cases holding
that the mere breach of a fiduciary obligation, without misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure, is not "deception" within the meaning
of section 10(b).6 2 Moreover, the court reasoned that the misap-
propriation theory permits a case to be predicated on a breach of
duty to one who is neither a buyer nor a seller of securities, thus
omitting a necessary element of a section 10(b) violation.63 Ac-
cordingly, the defendant's conviction for securities fraud, which
was based on the misappropriation theory, was overturned.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and affirmed
the defendant's Rule 10b-5 conviction under the misappropriation
theory. Unfortunately, the majority opinion, authored by Justice
Ginsburg, did not offer any theoretical justification for banning in-
sider trading or endorsing the misappropriation theory other than
that it insures honest securities markets and promotes investor
confidence. 64 Rather, the Court attempted to show how the insider
trading laws fit into the various theories used to justify the ban."
According to the Court, the breach of a duty of loyalty or confi-
dentiality by a fiduciary, which deprives a principal of the exclusive
use of confidential information, and the self-serving use of that in-
formation to purchase or sell securities satisfy the "deception" and
"in connection with" requirements of Rule 10b-5. 66 Since the
Court limited the misappropriation theory to situations where the
defendant was entrusted with access to confidential information
and deceived the source of the information by using that informa-
tion for personal trading, it is unclear how the Court would hold
62 See id. at 616-19.
63 See id. at 617. The purchaser-seller requirement comes from Blue Chips Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The view of the O'Hagan circuit court that this
requirement is not a standing requirement but rather an interpretation of the "in connec-
tion with" language of section 10(b) was contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 646 (1983), and was rejected by the Supreme Court. See supra
note 33. Justice Thomas, dissenting, agreed with the Eighth Circuit's analysis.
64 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210. Justice Scalia filed an opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, rejecting the misappropriation theory, in a criminal case under Rule
10b-5 on grounds of lenity. Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice, filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment on the defendant's mail fraud convictions but dissenting on his
conviction under the securities laws.
65 In its discussion of the harm to the investing public, the breach of fiduciary duty, and
the deception of the source of the confidential information, the Court invokes the parity of
information, fiduciary duty, and property rights theories. See id. at 2208, 2210.
66 See id. at 2210.
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on a variety of other fact patterns.
In dictum, the Court stated that if a fiduciary discloses to his
source his plans to trade on nonpublic information, there is no de-
ception and, therefore, no Rule 10b-5 violation.67 The Court
stressed that such disclosure must be made to all whom the trader
owes a duty of loyalty and confidentiality,6" although the source
could presumably trade on the information. From a theory and
policy perspective, this is the weakest part of the Court's opinion
simply because it fails to tie the ban against insider trading to the
overarching disclosure policies of the securities laws that mandate
disclosure to public investors. There is little justification for mak-
ing the breach of an agency or fiduciary duty to an employer, cli-
ent, or similar beneficiary a federal, rather than a state law, claim
unless a national economic interest is implicated. The securities
laws generally mandate public disclosure about issuers and trans-
actions in their securities, in order to foster investor confidence in
the fairness of the public securities markets. The theories making
insider trading illegal should be tied to these general federal dis-
closure policies.
D. Insider Trading in Advance of Tender Offers
In addition to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the SEC has util-
ized the 1968 Williams Act amendments to the Exchange Act, and
in particular, section 14(e)69 and Rule 14e-370 thereunder, to com-
bat trading on nonpublic information regarding potential tender
offers. The Williams Act was enacted to protect investors when
confronted with an offer to purchase their shares in a change of
control transaction through its requirements of disclosure and
equal or fair rights to participate in the tender offer. Rule 14e-3
was adopted not long after Chiarella in order to provide the SEC
with a better tool than Rule 10b-5 for dealing with the misuse of
information in the tender offer arena. 71
Rule 14e-3 imposes a disclose or abstain requirement upon
any person, other than a bidder or prospective bidder, who is in
possession of material information relating to a tender offer
which information he knows or has reason to know is non-
67 See id. at 2209.
68 See id. at 2226 n.7.
69 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
70 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1998).
71 Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, 20 SEC Docket (CCH) 1241
(Sept. 4,1980). The author was a Commissioner of the SEC when this rule was proposed.
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public and which he knows or has reason to know has been ac-
quired directly or indirectly from (1) the offering person, (2) ...
[the target], or (3) any officer, director, partner or employee or
72any other person acting on behalf of the offering person ....
The SEC, in a release adopting Rule 14e-3, justified the rule
on the grounds that trading by persons in possession of material,
nonpublic information relating to a tender offer results in unfair
disparities in market information and market disruption because
security holders who purchase from, or sell to, such persons are ef-
fectively denied the protections of the Williams Act. If furnished
with information about the tender offer, however, these investors
could make an informed investment decision.13 No breach of a fi-
duciary duty need be demonstrated under this theory, which is es-
sentially the parity of information theory in the context of a tender
offer. In addition, Rule 14e-3 was clearly intended to enforce the
disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act relating to tender offers.
Because Rule 14e-3 avoids some important elements required
in a Rule 10b-5 action, in particular the need to prove breach of a
fiduciary duty and scienter,7'4 persistent questions existed concern-
ing its validity since its adoption. These questions were first ad-
dressed by the Second Circuit in the aforementioned case of
United States v. Chestman5 In an en banc decision (with one dis-
72 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3.
73 See Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, 20 SEC Docket (CCH) 1241
(Sept. 4, 1980). Sections 13(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act require more than five per-
cent shareholders and bidders to disclose various matters, including any intention to make
a tender offer. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), n(e). In addition to disclosure obligations run-
ning from a bidder or prospective bidder to the shareholders of a target company, the
Williams Act also imposes duties of fairness on bidders to such target shareholders.
Among other things, section 14(d) of the Exchange Act requires that tendered shares are
withdrawable for a specific period; if the offer is for less than 100% and more shares are
tendered than desired, that acceptance must be pro rata; and that if the offer price is raised
within 10 days of the commencement of the offer, those shareholders who have already
tendered are entitled to the higher price. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d). A target company
shareholder who sells in advance of a tender offer announcement loses these protections.
But, why is he worse off if he sells to a buyer with inside information about the forthcom-
ing tender offer? This Article argues there should be some relationship between the buyer
and the bidder for the rule to be justified as prophylactic.
74 The scienter requirement stems from the Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
75 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
In the circuit court's first opinion in this case, a majority found that a Rule 14e-3 criminal
conviction was invalid, but the two majority judges set forth different reasons for their
finding. On the one hand, Judge Carman found that Rule 14e-3 was a valid exercise of the
SEC's authority, but only because he read the rule as requiring proof of scienter and a
breach of a fiduciary relationship. He, nevertheless, voted to reverse Chestman's convic-
tion because the district court failed to instruct the jury as to those elements. See United
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sent), Judge Meskill, writing for the majority, upheld the defen-
dant's conviction and the SEC's authority to promulgate Rule 14e-
3 on two grounds. First, the statutory power to define and pre-
scribe means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent acts and
practices permits the SEC to define fraud beyond the common law
definition. 6 Second, the power to prevent fraud in the tender offer
context necessarily encompasses the power to proscribe conduct
outside the purview of common law or SEC-defined fraud.77 The
Seventh and Tenth Circuits subsequently joined in this rationale. 78
Likewise, in the O'Hagan case,79 the Supreme Court held that
by giving the SEC the authority to regulate nondeceptive activities
as a reasonably designed means of preventing manipulative acts
under section 14(e), the "[c]ommission may prohibit acts, not
themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b)," if the
prohibition is reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent acts and
practices.8 0  Further, under either a definitional or preventive
analysis, the Court gave the SEC rulemaking deference regarding
Rule 14e-3.81
There is a difference between interpreting a broad or ambigu-
ous statute or rule by referring to the common law, and holding, as
the Eighth Circuit appeared to do in O'Hagan, that a statute and
rule is limited by the common law. Congress passed broad, reme-
dial securities legislation, like the Exchange Act, in order to make
the public securities markets fair and equitable because of the in-
adequacies in the common law. Further, it is clear from recent
amendments to the Exchange Act that Congress intends for in-
sider trading to be unlawful. However, the Supreme Court, in
O'Hagan, did not rely upon the argument, accepted elsewhere, 2
States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1990) (Carman, J., concurring). On the
other hand, Judge Mahoney took the position that Rule 14e-3 was beyond the SEC's
authority because it does not require that any fiduciary duty exist or be violated. He in-
terpreted the "deceptive acts or practices" language of section 14(e) as limiting the SEC's
rulemaking authority to common law fraud, and he further took the position that such
fraud requires a pre-existing duty. See id. at 85 (Mahoney, J., concurring).
76 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 558.
77 See id.
78 See SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir.
1992).
79 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
80 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2217 (1997).
81 See id. at 2218 n.19. The Court relied upon the deference standard of Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Court
pointed out that the language of section 14(e) more closely resembles section 15(c)(2)
than section 10(b). See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2217 n.16.
82 See Maio, 51 F.3d at 633.
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that Congress had amended the Exchange Act to impose sanctions
for violation of Rule 14e-3, which by implication approved the rule
as interpreted by the SEC. 3 Perhaps this was because Congress
has never defined insider trading nor set forth any theories as to
why it is wrong.
E. Statutory Developments in the 1980s
In 1984 and 1988 the Exchange Act was amended both to in-
crease the sanctions for insider trading and make SEC enforce-
ment more effective. Before describing the 1984 and 1988 statutes,
some background on damage claims brought under Rule 10b-5 is
necessary. In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,s4 a case growing out of the
widespread insider trading in McDonnell Douglas stock, the Sec-
ond Circuit implied a private right of action against traders and
tippees for investors who purchased securities in the open market
during the period of the illegal sales and prior to public disclosure
of the adverse news. This private action had enormous civil liabil-
ity potential and, in the context of a suit against an issuer, could
have resulted in the possible unfairness, shifting the losses from
one group of shareholders, who purchased or sold before material
information was released, to those shareholders owning stock at
the time an insider trading case concluded.
In response, the courts backed away from the implications of
Shapiro. In Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,85 the Second Circuit
announced a disgorgement measure of damages in insider trading
cases. In explaining why an out-of-pocket measure should be re-
jected, the court pointed to the "potential for imposition of Dra-
conian, exorbitant damages, out of all proportion to the wrong
committed, lining the pockets of all interim investors and their
counsel at the expense of innocent corporate stockholders."86 In
addition to cutting down on the measure of damages, the court
subsequently cut back on the scope of the permissible plaintiff
class in insider trading cases. After Chiarella and Dirks, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,87 declined to imply a
private right of action in favor of a selling shareholder of a target
corporation where there had been purchases of the target's shares
83 See id. at 635 n.11.
84 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
85 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
86 Id. at 170. In Wilson v. Comtech Communications Corp, the Second Circuit also
limited the class of plaintiffs to "contemporaneous traders." 648 F.2d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir.
1981).
87 See 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
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by an investment banker and his tippees, all of whom had learned
about a takeover bid. In Moss, the investment banker's employer
represented the bidder, and the court held that there was no duty
owed by the bidder's investment banker to the target or its share-
holders. Ironically, the court sustained a criminal conviction
against the insider traders under the misappropriation theory."8
The Elkind and Moss cases were criticized for failing to pro-
vide a significant monetary sanction against insider traders while at
the same time sending people to jail for conduct for which they
were not civilly liable. 9 Thus, in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984 ("ITSA"),9° Congress gave the SEC the authority to seek
up to three times the profits made, or losses avoided, as a civil
penalty against insider traders. This penalty was intended to be
imposed over and above any other remedies against the wrong-
doer.91
The insider trading scandals of the 1980s received national at-
tention after the enactment of the ITSA of 1984 so this law was
perceived as ineffective. In an atmosphere of impending elections,
Congress responded by passing the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 ("ITSFEA").92 This law reversed
Moss by creating a private right of action on behalf of contempo-
raneous traders,93 inserted a new bounty provision for persons who
provide information on insider trading violations,94 increased
criminal fines to $1,000,000 for individuals and $2,500,000 for non-
natural persons,95 and gave the SEC greater authority to investi-
gate international securities law violations. 96 In addition, broker-
dealers and investment advisers were required to establish Chinese
88 See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12,16 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Cour-
tois, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,024 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981).
89 See Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lob-5: A Restitution
Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349,396-97 (1984).
90 Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of 15
U.S.C. § 78 (1994)).
91 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect
on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1280-81 (1984) [hereinafter Langevoort, Insider
Trading Sanctions Act].
92 Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of
15 U.S.C. §§ 78, 80b-4a; see Larry R. Lavoie, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud En-
forcement Act of 1988, 22 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 1 (1989).
93 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a). In effect, the hold-
ing of Wilson v. Comtech Communications Corp., 648 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981), was adopted
as law. See supra note 86.
94 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e).
95 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), id. § 78ff(a).
96 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2(1), id. § 78b(1).
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Walls and other procedures designed to prevent the misuse of ma-
terial, nonpublic information. 97 By providing a remedy to open
market sellers of a target company's stock to a bidder's tippees,
Congress endorsed the liability of traders on market information
in such situations.
In 1987 a serious legislative attempt was made to codify a
definition of insider trading. A committee of securities lawyers
suggested a definition that was then introduced as part of the In-
sider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987.98 It read: "information
shall have been used or obtained wrongfully only if it has been ob-
tained by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, theft,
conversion, misappropriation or a breach of any fiduciary, contrac-
tual, employment, personal, or other relationship of trust and con-
fidence." 99
The SEC objected to this definition and proposed a different
bill."0 After hearings, a revised bill, different from the initial Sen-
ate bill and the SEC initial proposal, was suggested that stated:
[T]rading while in possession of material, non-public informa-
tion is wrongful only if such information has been obtained by,
or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, (A) theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through electronic or
other means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation or any other
breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of any personal or other rela-
tionship of trust and confidence, or breach of any contractual or
employment relationship. 10 1
The substitution of a "possession" for a "use" standard
proved so controversial that no action was thereafter taken until
the next session of Congress when ITSFEA was passed.102 That
1988 statute contained no definition of insider trading on the the-
ory that a statutory definition could have a potentially narrowing
effect.103 However, the legislative history endorsed a broad fiduci-
97 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(f), id. § 78o(f); Investment Advisers Act of
1940 § 204A, 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-4(a).
98 S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987).
99 Id. § 2.
100 See Text of Draft "Insider Trading Act of 1987" Submitted by Securities & Ex-
change Commission, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1284 (Aug. 7,1987).
101 SEC Compromise Proposal on Insider Trading Legislation; Accompanying Letter,
and Analysis by Ad Hoc Legislation Committee, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1817
(Nov. 18, 1987).
102 See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, United States v. Chestman-Trading Securities on
the Basis of Nonpublic Information in Advance of a Tender Offer, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 595,
616 (1991).
103 Cf. H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048.
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ary duty standard and the misappropriation theory. 4
F. Short Swing Profit Prohibitions
Cady, Roberts, Texas Gulf Sulphur, Investors Management,
and Dirks were all cases that involved classic leaks of undisclosed
material information emanating from a corporate source. The ban
against insider trading is also reinforced by the provisions of sec-
tion 16 of the Exchange Act ("section 16"),1°5 which require offi-
cers, directors, and holders of more than ten percent of any Ex-
change Act reporting issuer's stock to report all of their purchase
and sale transactions in the equity securities of that issuer and to
disgorge any profits on transactions effected within a six month
period to the issuer. Section 16 sets out to prevent the unfair use
of information that may have been obtained by insiders in the pur-
chase or sale of securities. The prohibition is designed to inhibit
officers, directors, and shareholders, who, with the benefit of ad-
vance information, trade in the stocks of their own companies. 10 6
Section 16 is thus a crude rule of thumb since the liability of an in-
sider for short swing profits does not require the actual use of in-
side information.107
Section 16 is a remarkably effective prophylactic tool for pre-
venting trading on inside information by officers, directors, and
major stockholders."6 Since the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, there
have been many insider trading cases over the years, but most
have not involved direct trading by corporate officials. As a result,
it has been debated as to whether there is a continuing need for
the section 16 reporting requirements and short swing profit pro-
hibitions. However, in light of stepped up SEC -and civil enforce-
ment of insider trading violations and other shareholder reporting
requirements, 10 9 there are strong policy arguments against repeal-
ing section 16, as it plays a dual rule in curbing trading on inside
information while permitting insiders to own stock in their firms."'
104 "[Ilndividuals have a duty not to 'misappropriate' information from their employers
or otherwise in breach of a fiduciary or other relationship of trust and confidence, and
commit securities fraud when they trade in possession of misappropriated information or
tip others who trade." Id. at 10, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6047.
105 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994).
106 See id.
107 See Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir. 1947); Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231,236 (2d Cir. 1943).
108 See Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Uni-
fied Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088 (1994).
109 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
110 See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on
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G. Scalping and Front Running
The practice of front running involves trading on the basis of
nonpublic market information, regarding impending market trans-
actions, by broker-dealers or investment advisers."' Such conduct
embraces a variety of scenarios including: trading ahead or scalp-
ing a customer order in the same security; front running a noncus-
tomer block transaction; or taking a position in stock index futures
or options contracts in advance of a principal block transaction.12
Brokers who have customers' orders in hand and trade ahead of
them, or investment advisers who trade ahead of their recommen-
dations to clients, breach their fiduciary duties and therefore vio-
late the antifraud provisions if they fail to disclose such trading
ahead.' 3 If a dealer learns about a large block and trades on that
information, it is doubtful whether he has violated Rule 10b-5 as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, both front run-
ning a non-customer block transaction and intermarket front run-
ning have been interpreted by the SEC and securities self-
regulatory organizations as misuses of market information that can
violate just and equitable principles of trade."4
It has been suggested by one commentator that scalping and
front running should not be regarded as insider trading."' How-
ever, in United States v. Carpenter,16 the SEC prosecuted a finan-
cial journalist for trading ahead of write-ups about issuers in his
stock market gossip column. At first, one of the SEC's arguments
was that this was a breach of duty to the journalist's readers.
However, after protests about the SEC's interference with the
First Amendment rights of financial journalists, the case was
prosecuted on the misappropriation theory."7 This case is better
Regulation of Insider Trading-Part II: Reform of Section 16,42 Bus. LAW. 1087 (1987).
'I See Mahlon M. Frankhauser & David S. Frye, Front Running, 21 REV. SEC. &
COMM. REG. 19 (1988).
112 See id. The question of whether, or how, trading in derivatives is trading on inside
information that violates section 10(b) or 16(b) has long been vexing. See Karl Shumpei
Okamato, Oversimplification and the SEC's Treatment of Derivative Sec. Trading by Cor-
porate Insiders, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1287; Steve Thel, Closing a Loophole: Insider Trading
in Standardized Options, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (1988).
113 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181-82 (1963); Opper
v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); E.F. Hutton & Co., Ex-
change Act Release No. 25,887, [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303
(July 6, 1988).
114 See Frankhauser & Frye, supra note 111, at 179-86.
115 See Fisch, supra note 2, at 206.
116 484 U.S. 19 (1987); see discussion supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
117 See R. FOSTER WINANS, TRADING SECRETS 282, 303 (1986). But see Zweig v.
Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Campbell, [1972-1973 Transfer
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analyzed as a "scalping" case since it is factually similar to the ac-
tivity of an investment adviser trading ahead of his own research
recommendations. Nevertheless, if the journalist owes no duty to
investors, and breach of a fiduciary duty is legally required under
the Court's jurisprudence, a scalping theory is not available under
Rule 10b-5.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE BAN ON INSIDER TRADING
A. Fairness and Parity of Information
The preamble to the Exchange Act provides that it is an "[a]ct
to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-
the-counter markets.., to prevent inequitable and unfair practices
on such exchanges and markets.""' The necessity for SEC regula-
tion, as spelled out in section 2 of the Exchange Act, 9 refers to the
national public interest in securities transactions conducted upon
public securities markets, the importance of the prices established
in such transactions, and the need to insure the maintenance of fair
and honest securities markets. 2 The SEC's insider trading policy
is best understood as an effort to achieve fair pricing in the public
securities markets in furtherance of the general goals of the stat-
ute.
In Cady, Roberts, the SEC enunciated its view that the
antifraud provisions of section 10(b) go beyond the common law
and are not dependent upon an insider's relationship to stockhold-
ers.' Rather, the SEC was concerned about "the plight of the
buying public-wholly unprotected from the misuse of special in-
formation."' 2 Further, the classes of persons upon whom an obli-
gation to disclose material information rests is not limited to cor-
porate insiders such as officers, directors, and controlling
shareholders because such an obligation relies upon two principal
elements:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,580 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
118 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 pmbl., 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
119 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
120 See id.
121 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,911 n.13,913 n.21 (1961).
122 Id. at 913.
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takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing.2 .
Over the next decade, the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit endorsed the views that the SEC had enunciated in Cady,
Roberts concerning the reach of section 10(b). In SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,124 the Second Circuit adopted a parity of infor-
mation theory in imposing liability on corporate insiders and their
immediate and remote tippees. 12 In Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States,'26 which involved the failure of securities purchasers
to disclose the higher, prevailing market price that the sellers could
not readily ascertain, the Supreme Court found that the defen-
dants could not "stand mute" under the first and third subpara-
graphs of Rule 10b-5.111 In this outsider trading case involving
taking unfair advantage by remaining silent, the Court found a
duty to speak under section 10(b) and essentially affirmed the
equal access or parity of information theory.""
After these cases were decided, but before the Chiarella deci-
sion, Professor Victor Brudney provided a theoretical affirmation
of the parity of information theory.'29 Brudney's theory was that
section 10(b) prohibits the exploitation of unerodable informa-
tional advantages in the securities marketplace, that is not only the
informational advantages of insiders, but also of outsiders who do
not lawfully disclose material information about securities. 30 Since
the securities laws were intended to promote public confidence in
the securities markets, the application of section 10(b) to insiders
emanated from the disclosure obligations of corporations and their
officials, and to outsiders from investors' anticipations regarding
fairness in the marketplace.' For this reason, according to Brud-
ney, the inability of the public investor to lawfully acquire the un-
disclosed information was the foundation upon which the "disclose
123 Id. at 912.
124 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
125 See id. at 861, 864.
126 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
127 Id. at 153. The buyers were two individuals and a bank, not a broker-dealer, and
therefore the antifraud provisions specifically applicable to broker-dealers were not at is-
sue. Id. at 154 n.16.
128 See id.; cf. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
Later these cases were distinguished or ignored, and in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 233-35 (1980), the parity of information theory was rejected.
129 See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
130 See id. at 357.
131 See id. at 353.
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or refrain" rule rested.132
Brudney struggled with the two problems inherent in the par-
ity of information theory: the suppression of information and the
breadth of the rule. Although Brudney conceded that section
10(b) may sometimes force disclosure to the marketplace, he
viewed it generally as a regulatory device prohibiting trading by
those with an unfair informational advantage.'33 Brudney felt that
the problems with the rule's breadth could be solved to some ex-
tent by requiring proof of scienter in section 10(b) cases. Never-
theless, he conceded that the principles were not without difficulty
in application.34
Other scholars also have condemned insider trading as unfair
and wrong.'35 Because the Supreme Court has rejected the parity
of information doctrine, some scholars have advocated that Con-
gress enact the parity of information theory in statutory form, un-
der the guise of either equal access to information or equal infor-
mation.'36 Professor Kim Lane Scheppele has used contractarian
ethics for a more recent justification for the parity of information
theory.37 She argued that equity cases generally support the prin-
ciple that those with asymmetrical information cannot take advan-
tage of those unable to obtain such information, even in arms
length bargaining transactions. 3 ' This is because "shallow secrets"
can be investigated and ascertained, whereas "deep secrets" can-
not.13 9 Furthermore, the principle that persons with asymmetrical
informational advantages must refrain from exploiting them com-
ports with psychological and ethical behavioral assumptions, given
the complicated and anonymous relationships that now character-
ize corporate America.140
132 See id. at 359.
133 See id. at 338-39.
134 See id. at 365-67.
135 See Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 55-62 (1986); Steven R. Salbu, Tipper Credibility, Nonin-
formational Tippee Trading, and Abstention from Trading: An Analysis of Gaps in the In-
sider Trading Laws, 68 WASH. L. REV. 307 (1993); William K.S. Wang, Trading on Mate-
rial Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can
Sue Whom Under Rule 10b-5, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1234-35 (1981).
136 See Joel Seligman, The Reformation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpub-
lic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1137-40 (1985).
137 See Kim Lane Scheppele, "It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 123.
138 See id. at 131-34.
139 Id. at 159-61.
140 See id. at 134-40, 150-68. On the other hand, banning all trading by persons with
asymmetrical informational advantages would be impractical, and probably damaging, to
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The SEC has never wholly abandoned the parity of informa-
tion theory, but rather has based its actions on the egregious facts
of numerous cases, public outrage concerning these cases, and
whatever theories the Supreme Court appeared to permit. Re-
gardless, with respect to the insider trading scandals of the 1980s
involving Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, and nu-
merous other traders, theory hardly mattered in prosecuting and
settling cases and persuading Congress to increase the penalties for
trading on insider information. 4' At the height of these scandals
then Chairman of the SEC, John Shad, justified the ban on insider
trading stating:
Countries with broad public ownership of securities generally
enjoy the greatest economic and political stability. Insider
trading benefits the few at the expense of the many. It impug-
nes the integrity of the securities markets. It is hardly fair to pit
the investing public against those who have access to inside in-
formation. It is and should be illegal.'42
It is noteworthy that most of the cases discussed thus far in-
volved outside information about upcoming tender offers. Un-
doubtedly, it would have surprised the defendants in these cases to
learn that judges and academics were debating not only whether,
but also why they were behaving illegally. Most of the cases were
settled, often with guilty pleas and huge penalties.43 Moreover,
the denizens of Wall Street who opened secret foreign bank ac-
counts and travelled with cash-filled suitcases believed their con-
duct to be unlawful. 44
In not reinstating the parity of information theory in its
broadest form, the O'Hagan court stated that "informational dis-
parity is inevitable in the securities markets.' ' 45 The Court did,
however, recognize fundamental fairness and honesty in the secu-
rities markets as essential in promoting investor confidence:
[I]nvestors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a
market liquidity.
141 See JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OFTHIEVES (1991); Karen W. Arenson, How Wall St.
Bred an Ivan Boesky, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,1986, § 3 (Business), at 1; James B. Stewart &
Daniel Hertzberg, Spreading Scandal: Fall of Ivan F. Boesky Leads to Broader Probe of
Inside Information, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at Al; supra text accompanying notes 92-
97.
142 John Shad, Misperceptions Plague View of Agency Role, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1986,
at 34.
143 See DOUGLAS FRANTZ, LEVINE & CO.: WALL STREET'S INSIDER TRADING
SCANDAL 331-48 (1987); STEWART, supra note 141, at 272,296, 337, 437.
144 See STEWART, supra note 141, at 73, 97, 132, 143.
145 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (1997).
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market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic in-
formation is unchecked by law. An investor's informational
disadvantage vis-d-vis a misappropriator with material, non-
public information stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a dis-
advantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill."
In the tender offer arena, since breach of fiduciary duty is not
required, parity of information is a more viable theory. In this set-
ting, the theory states that information about a forthcoming tender
offer should only be known to the bidder until the bid is publicly
announced. Further, the only appropriate channel for such an an-
nouncement is through the disclosure provisions of the Williams
Act.
B. Fiduciary Duty and Misappropriation
In enacting the federal securities laws, Congress obviously de-
cided that common law protections for investors were insufficient.
Yet, in Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court sharply nar-
rowed the application of section 10(b) to insider trading cases by
the radical device of limiting the content of section 10(b) to a
common law breach of duty, and by the use of a restrictive view of
the common law.147
It is easy to criticize the fiduciary duty theory since it is unduly
narrow from both a legal and a policy perspective. The common
law imposes much broader duties on those with superior informa-
tional advantages than the Chiarella Court would require under
section 10(b). 148 To narrow the reach of section 10(b) the Court
engaged in specious logic in analyzing the common law and its re-
lationship to the Exchange Act and in distinguishing a prior Rule
146 Id.
147 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Writing for the majority, Justice Powell reasoned:
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty
between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on mate-
rial, nonpublic information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relation-
ship between two parties, should not be undertaken absent some explicit evi-
dence of congressional intent.
Id. at 233.
148 Dissenting in Chiarella, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the common law of ac-
tionable misrepresentation had long treated the possession of "special facts" as a key to
the duty to disclose. He argued that the Court's narrow construction of section 10(b) put
the federal securities laws in the rearguard of the movement to make the markets fairer,
"a position opposite to the expectations of Congress at the time the securities laws were
enacted." Id. at 248; see Deborah A. Demott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?:
Duties of Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65 (1994); Scheppele,
supra note 137.
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10b-5 case, which held that affirmative misrepresentations were
not required under section 10(b).1 49 This precedent disabled the
Court in O'Hagan from setting forth a theoretical basis for the
misappropriation theory, since the Court was impelled to distin-
guish Chiarella on the ground that fiduciary relationships, in addi-
tion to those between securities traders, could be the basis for an
insider trading violation. 50 Yet, the blame for the confusion in
these decisions lies with the SEC and Congress as well as the Su-
preme Court. Section 10(b) is impermissibly vague for a criminal
statute, and Rule 10b-5 enlarges, rather than clarifies, its parame-
ters. 5' Further, the SEC has stubbornly adhered to the parity of
information theory in cases where the misappropriation theory is
unavailable, without explaining or justifying it.
Instead of going to Congress for clarification of the duty of
traders with superior information to disclose such information or
abstain from trading, the SEC after Chiarella chose to follow the
misappropriation theory as set forth by Chief Justice Burger in his
Chiarella dissenting opinion. According to Chief Justice Berger, a
rule permitting parties to an arm's length transaction to refrain
from disclosing information absent a confidential or fiduciary rela-
tion "permits a businessman to capitalize on his experience and
skill in securing and evaluating relevant information; it provides
incentive for hard work, careful analysis, and astute forecasting."'52
Yet, these very policies should limit the rule so that "a person who
has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty
to disclose that information or to refrain from trading."'53
The classical theory on prohibiting trading on inside informa-
tion applies to corporate insiders or their tippees. The misappro-
priation theory, however, also applies to outsiders who trade on
market information. In general, the misappropriation theory pro-
vides that a person violates Rule 10b-5 when he
(1) misappropriates material nonpublic information, (2) by
breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confi-
dence and (3) uses that information in a securities transaction,
(4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the sharehold-
149 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1971).
150 See 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2212 (1997).
151 This was the basis of Justice Scalia's dissent in O'Hagan. See id. at 2220. It is also
why the court was unable to uphold Chiarella's conviction under the misappropriation
theory as it was never presented to the jury.
152 United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980).
'53 Id.
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ers of the traded stock."5 4
The misappropriation theory is based on fraud on the part of
the source of the material, nonpublic information, a fact which
gives rise to both the strength and the weakness of this theory.
First, it is extremely flexible, capable of capturing so many types of
fact patterns that, according to Professor Donald C. Langevoort, it
"has all but preempted the abstain or disclose standard restrained
in Chiarella and Dirks."'155 This trend is likely to continue after
O'Hagan. Second, commentators have argued that the misappro-
priation theory casts too wide a net over insider trading without
sufficient clarity to determine which traders will be caught in that
net. These critics generally advocate a definition of insider trading
by statutory amendment or SEC rulemaking. 56 Other critics have
argued that the misappropriation theory is too narrow because it
does not prevent those who possess material, nonpublic informa-
tion from trading on it, even though such trading becomes illicit
when the information is "stolen" by an employee, agent, or confi-
dant.15 7
It is unlikely that these debates will be resolved by the en-
dorsement of the misappropriation theory given by O'Hagan. The
SEC is more unlikely than ever to seek statutory clarification of
this amorphous crime. But, O'Hagan leaves open the question of
illegality of many forms of outsider trading on material, nonpublic
information-for example: cases involving family or other per-
sonal relationships rather than fiduciaries; outsider trading on
market information other than tender offers; and warehousing.
The most perplexing aspect of the misappropriation theory is
the way it transforms a breach of duty to an employer or client un-
der state law into a fraud under the federal securities laws. Profes-
sor Langevoort has suggested that this should be justified under
the theory that it is the public investor who is deceived.'58 While
154 SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990).
155 Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella's History,
Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 876 (1995) [hereinafter Langevoort,
Words from on High].
156 See Jonn R. Beeson, Comment, Rounding the Peg to Fit the Hole: A Proposed
Regulatory Reform of the Misappropriation Theory, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1077, 1141-47
(1996); Fisch, supra note 2, at 235-51; Hazen, supra note 102, at 616-17.
157 Beeson, supra note 156, at 1137-40; Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory
of Insider Trading: A Legal, Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
223 (1992).
158 See Langevoort, Words from on High, supra note 155. Perhaps the theory should be
that the public investor is not advised that the insider trader has obtained information in
an unfair way.
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this pragmatic approach borrows from the equal access to informa-
tion theory, but limits it to a definable group, it is not satisfying
from a policy perspective. Why should investors be protected
against traders who have stolen information but not from other
traders who also have unerodable informational advantages? A
better theory would provide a linkage between the prohibition
against trading and the obligations of issuers, tender offerors, and
securities industry fiduciaries to disclose material, nonpublic in-
formation.
C. Efficiency
The academic literature on insider trading has devoted a con-
siderable amount of attention to the question of whether trading
on inside information contributes to, or undermines, market effi-
ciency. This debate was initiated by Professor Henry Manne, who
argued that insider trading contributes to efficiency in stock mar-
ket pricing because information becomes embedded in stock prices
more quickly than it would if insiders waited until such informa-
tion was ripe for disclosure.'59 Further, the profits made by insiders
on such trades are an appropriate reward for their labor. Manne's
argument gained some respectability when it was adopted by
scholars like Professors Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel. 160
In response to Manne and others, there is now a substantial
body of academic literature arguing that insider trading makes the
public securities markets inefficient and that, therefore, it should
be banned. There are several aspects to this argument. First, al-
lowing such trading would encourage insiders to manipulate cor-
porate decisionmaking and withhold information from the market.
In contrast, prohibiting insider trading removes an impediment to
159 See MANNE, supra note 2.
160 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 251 (1991); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2. The no-
tion that insider trading contributes to market efficiency is dependent on the efficient
market hypothesis. This theory of the relationship between disclosure of financially sig-
nificant information and changes in securities prices gained enormous acceptance in the
law and economics literature of the 1980s. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanics of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1984). According to this
theory, market efficiency can occur on three different levels. The weak form of market
efficiency exists when securities prices reflect all the information embodied in the past
prices of that security. The semi-strong form of market efficiency exists when security
prices reflect all available public information. The strong form of market efficiency exists
when security prices reflect all information, whether publicly available or not. See Eugene
T. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN.
383 (1970). Manne took this finance theory and endorsed the strong form of market effi-
ciency as a goal for SEC regulatory policy.
[Vol. 20:83
A BREACH IN SEARCH OF A DUTY
the prompt release of information and promotes economic effi-
ciency by assuring that share prices reflect their true value. Such
informational efficiency assures that capital is allocated effi-
ciently.'61 Also, permitting insider trading would discourage re-
search and analysis because the public information available to an
analyst would not reflect all of the facts upon which trading is oc-
curring.62
Even in the 1980s, scholars began to argue that the public se-
curities markets are not, in fact, efficient.'63 A combination of fac-
tors, including investor psychology, economic developments and
trading technologies, and not informational efficiency, influenced
stock market prices on October 19-20, 1987, when the Dow Jones
averages lost approximately thirty percent of their value.'64 There
are many such days in the market, either for the averages generally
or for individual securities, when investor preferences or fashions,
or macroeconomic, political, or psychological forces, rather than
company-specific material facts, are the primary determinants of
stock market pricing. 65
The efficient market hypothesis has influenced the SEC in
some rulemaking proceedings, notably in its adoption of the inte-
grated disclosure system. 66 Some court cases also have been influ-
enced by this theory. 167 Nevertheless, the federal securities laws,
and particularly the antifraud provisions, were primarily enacted
to promote investor confidence in the fairness and honesty of the
markets, and only secondarily to achieve efficiency in stock market
pricing. To the extent Congress made a connection between fair-
ness and efficiency, it was to stress that when markets are ma-
161 See Brudney, supra note 129, at 334; Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading
Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1053-60
(1982); Wang, supra note 135.
162 See Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 353, 355 (1988).
163 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly In-
formation, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Lynne A. Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Se-
curities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988); William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments
That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1986).
164 See TIM METZ, BLACK MONDAY: THE CATASTROPHE OF OCTOBER 17,1987, 144,
248-51 (1988); DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, SEC, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET
BREAK xi-xii (1988).
165 See John R. Dorfman, Sputnik Launch Spooked Stocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1996, at
Cl; Mind over Matter, ECONOMIST, Apr. 23,1994, at 73.
166 See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 6383, 24
SEC Docket (CCH) 1262 (Mar. 3, 1982); Proposed Rules, Securities Act Release No.
6335, 23 SEC Docket (CCH) 401,409 (Aug. 6, 1981).
167 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), and cases cited therein.
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nipulated or controlled, there can be excessive speculation which
will hinder the proper appraisal of a security's value.'68 This is
more of a moral and political rationale, rather than one based on
financial economics.
D. Property Rights
Another popular academic theory justifying the ban on in-
sider trading argues that it is a means of protecting business prop-
erty.'69 Permitting insider trading, on the other hand, would defeat
the desire for confidentiality of issuers and tender offerors. This
theory was developed by law and economics theorists as a re-
sponse to Professor Manne 70 and others who argued that insider
trading should be permitted, and also in support of the misappro-
priation theory. In his concurring opinion in United States v.
Chestman,"7' Judge Winter focused his analysis of the misappro-
priation theory on the protection of business property rights.7 1
The O'Hagan Court also relied on this theory. According to the
Court, "[a] company's confidential information.., qualifies as
property to which the company has a right of exclusive use....
The undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation
of a fiduciary duty... constitutes fraud akin to embezzle-
ment .... "I
The property rights theory appeals to those who believe that
securities regulation should be predicated on principles of eco-
nomics, rather than on principles of fairness.'74 However, the fed-
eral securities laws were based on the principle that when an issuer
goes public, investors are entitled to information about its business
168 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994). Public indignation
about insider trading abuses do not stem from calculations of economic efficiency. See
Cox & Fogarty, supra note 162, at 357.
169 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND
POLICY (1991); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 878; Easterbrook, supra note 2; Ed-
mund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 683, 718-19 (1980); Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 727, 759 (1988); Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of
Property Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 79 (1987).
170 Manne's thoughts are dismissed as a "romantic theory of authorship" in James
Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider
Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413,1508 (1992).
171 947 F.2d 551 (1991).
172 See id. at 576-78 (Winter, J., concurring).
173 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1997) (citation omitted).
174 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of Rules
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984).
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and affairs . 75 The easiest criticism of the property rights theory is
that when Congress passed and subsequently amended the Ex-
change Act, it was concerned about fairness and the protection of
investors, not the protection of property rights in information held
by issuers and traders. Protecting the source of confidential in-
formation is illogical when the parties injured by traders possessing
informational advantages are those who purchase or sell securities
without access to the material information.76 Further, the prop-
erty rights theory seems to be concerned with interests in informa-
tion that are generally protected by state law.177 The federal secu-
rities laws impose disclosure duties on issuers, bidders, and other
market participants and the insider trading laws should be viewed
as a means to enforce the investing public's right to this informa-
tion.
III. INSIDER TRADING AND MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
A. Continuous Disclosure
This Article proposes that the ban on insider trading be re-
lated to the disclosure obligations of issuers, bidders, and other
market participants under the federal securities laws, as a means to
enforce those obligations and accelerate the release of material in-
formation. Although the ban is regulatory, its necessity arises
from gaps in the disclosure system administered by the SEC, gaps
that can only be filled by the disclose or abstain doctrine.
The federal securities laws set forth a scheme of mandated
disclosure concerning the business and affairs and financial condi-
tion of public companies. The specific disclosure requirements are
established by the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act")' and the Exchange Act. The Securities Act is
primarily concerned with initial distributions of securities. It re-
quires that securities issuances be registered with the SEC prior to
sale, unless an appropriate exemption from registration exists.
The registration statement must contain specified information
about the security, the issuer, and the underwriter. 80
The Exchange Act is primarily concerned with post-
175 See S. REP. No. 73-47, at 6-7 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933).
176 See Langevoort, Words From on High, supra note 155, at 878.
'77 See id.; United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951-52 (4th Cir. 1995).
178 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1994).
179 See Securities Act of 1933 § 5,15 U.S.C. § 77e.
180 See Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g.
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distribution trading in securities. It requires publicly held compa-
nies to file annual and periodic reports with the SEC, including
audited annual financial statements.' The Exchange Act also
regulates proxy solicitations 8 ' and trading by insiders of public
companies"' and requires disclosure regarding tender offers for
shares of public companies.'84 Under the SEC's integrated disclo-
sure regulations, material in the Exchange Act reports can be in-
corporated by reference in Securities Act registration state-
ments.'
From 1934 until 1964, the year section 12(g) was added to the
Exchange Act,8 6 the only companies subject to the registration
provisions of the Exchange Act were those listed on national secu-
rities exchanges. Under section 12(g), all publicly traded compa-
nies of a certain size became subject to the reporting provisions of
the Exchange Act. Today, any corporation with 500 shareholders
and ten million dollars in assets must register its securities under
section 12(g)8 7 and, therefore, must file an annual report that con-
tains audited financial information with the SEC within ninety
days of the company's year-end.' Information in the annual re-
port, including the year-end financial statements, must also be sent
to shareholders in order to solicit proxies for the corporation's an-
nual meeting."8 9 Exchange Act reporting companies also must file
unaudited quarterly earnings reports.190
Although the Exchange Act's regime for corporate disclosure
is frequently referred to as a continuous disclosure system, it does
not, in fact, require corporations to make continuous disclosure of
material information. In addition to annual and quarterly reports,
the Exchange Act also requires companies to report certain mate-
rial events on Form 8-K. However, the events that tfigger a man-
datory filing are limited to: changes in control; the acquisition or
disposition of significant assets not in the ordinary course of busi-
ness; bankruptcy or receivership; a change of accountants; resigna-
181 See id. § 12-13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m.
182 See id § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
183 See id § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
184 See id §§ 13(e), 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e), n(d).
185 See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 6383, 24
SEC Docket (CCH) 1262 (Mar. 3,1982).
186 Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565, 576-77.
187 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1994); see SEC Rule 12(g)-i, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12(g)-i (1998).
188 See Form 10-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §§ 31,101-07 (Apr. 22,1998).
189 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
190 See Form 10-Q, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §§ 31,031-35 (Sept. 17,1997).
[Vol. 20:83
A BREACH IN SEARCH OFA DUTY
tion of directors; and a change in fiscal years. 9' These are water-
shed events in the life of a corporation, not events of routine mate-
riality that nevertheless can affect stock prices significantly. Al-
though a public corporation may report on Form 8-K any other
event the company "deems of importance to securities holders,"
the reporting of events of every day materiality is voluntary, not
mandatory.92 Furthermore, a report on Form 8-K concerning
changes in control, asset acquisitions or dispositions, bankruptcy,
or change in accountants is not required to be filed until fifteen
days after the event and other reports are not required to be filed
until five days after the event.93 These are lengthy time lags in to-
day's securities marketplace.
The stock exchanges have long had policies that require the
continuous disclosure of material information. For example, the
New York Stock Exchange provides that a listed company "is ex-
pected to release quickly to the public any news or information
which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the mar-
ket for its securities.' ' 194 The Securities Act Amendments of
1964-imposing continuous reporting requirements on all public
companies-were patterned after the disclosure obligations of the
stock exchanges. 95 Congress believed that a system of mandated
public disclosure was necessary under federal law to reinforce the
essentially voluntary obligations set forth in the exchange listing
agreements.96 By 1964, Congress felt that all public companies,
not only listed issuers, should be required to provide shareholders
with current information. 197
Even after 1964, there remained gaps in the SEC's disclosure
system. Two years later, Milton A. Cohen, head of the Special
Study of the Securities Markets, 9 which preceded the 1964
191 See Form 8-K, Items 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §§ 31,001-04, at 21,992-
96 (Apr. 22, 1998).
192 See Form 8-K, Item 5, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §§ 31,001-04, at 21,994 (Sept. 13,
1996).
193 See Form 8-K, General Instructions, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §§ 31,001-04, at
21,991-92 (Apr. 9,1997).
194 New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual (NYSE) § 202.05 (1997). The
American Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation System ("NASDAQ") have similar policies.
195 See 1 ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, 95TH CONG., REPORT TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N 574 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE REPORT].
196 See id.
197 See id. at 601-05.
198 See SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc.
No. 88-95 (1963).
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Amendments, advocated an integration of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act in order to focus SEC disclosure policy on the
obligations of public companies to provide information to the
trading markets on a continuous basis and not primarily in connec-
tion with issuances of securities. 199 The SEC achieved partial inte-
gration of these two statutes through rulemaking in 1982.200 The
recent Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regula-
tory Processes ("Wallman Commission") has recommended fur-
ther integration through a system of company, as opposed to secu-
rities, registration. 201
B. Transaction Reporting Requirements
Time lags also exist in the SEC requirements concerning the
reporting and disclosure of securities transactions. Officers and di-
rectors of an issuer that has a class of equity securities registered
under the Exchange Act and persons who beneficially own more
than ten percent of any class of such securities must report their
securities transactions to the SEC.20 2 These insiders are required to
report their initial statements of beneficial ownership and any
changes in ownership and must file an annual report of their secu-
rities ownership. 3 Transaction reports, however, do not need to
be filed until ten days after the close of the calendar month in
which any change in beneficial ownership occurred, 2°4 and the an-
nual report of securities ownership is not due until forty-five days
after the end of an issuer's fiscal year.205
There is a similar transaction reporting requirement for per-
sons who acquire more than five percent of any class of equity se-
curities registered under the Exchange Act. Such reports are re-
quired to be filed within ten days after such an acquisition. 2°6 This
ten-day window may provide an opportunity for persons who
know about an upcoming tender offer bid to trade in the target
company's securities before the announcement of a bidder's toe-
199 See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
200 See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 6383, 24
SEC Docket (CCH) 1262 (Mar. 3,1982).
201 See ADVISORY COMM. ON THE CAPITAL FORMATION AND REGULATORY
PROCESSES, REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) No. 1725 (Extra Issue), at 8-10 (July 24, 1996) [hereinafter WALLMAN
COMMISSION REPORT].
202 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a).
203 See id.
204 See id.
205 See SEC Rule 16a-3(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(f) (1998).
206 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
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hold position and intentions regarding a tender offer.207 Further,
persons making a tender offer need not disclose information about
themselves or the offer until the date on which the offer is first an-
nounced to security holders.2°8
C. Williams Act Disclosure Requirements
The legislative history of the Williams Act indicates Con-
gress's concern that, although disclosure was required in proxy
contests and exchange offers, regarding a proposed change in cor-
porate control, large blocks of stock could still be acquired in
complete secrecy through cash tender offers, market transactions,
and other arrangements. Absent information concerning a pro-
posed change in corporate control, and because the persons seek-
ing control of a company possessed information that might sub-
stantially affect the assumptions underlying the market value of a
corporation's securities, investors were forced to make investment
decisions based on a market price that did not necessarily reflect a
fair valuation of the target company's securities. 10
Accordingly, any five percent holder of Exchange Act regis-
tered securities or any person making a tender offer must publicly
disclose his background and source of funds, any intention to make
a tender offer, any plans for major changes in the target company,
and any other similar information. 211  Furthermore, the target
company must publicly disclose its opinion as to whether the offer
should be accepted or rejected, or its inability to take a position on
the matter. 2
In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,13 the Supreme
Court held that collusion between a bidder and target manage-
ment resulting in a lower bid price-even if fraudulent under state
law-was not "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" under sec-
tion 14(e), since that section only refers to fraudulent nondisclo-
sure. Thereafter, it was sometimes argued, for example, by the
Eighth Circuit in O'Hagan,214 that Schreiber put the same con-
straints on the SEC's rulemaking power under section 14(e) as the
207 See Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13D.
208 See SEC Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4.
209 See CORPORATE DISCLOSURE REPORT, supra note 196, at 610.
210 See H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 2 (1968); S. REP. No. 90-550, at 2 (1967).
211 See Schedules 13D, 14D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13D, .14D.
212 See SEC Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2; see also SEC Rule 14d-9, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-9.
213 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
214 92 F.3d 612, 623 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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Court had determined the agency has under section 10(b). Others
questioned this interpretation and confined Schreiber to its facts,
which involved allegations of a breach of duty by directors rather
than fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive activities by traders in
the public securities markets. The Supreme Court, in O'Hagan,
distinguished Schreiber on the ground that it involved an interpre-
tation of the term "manipulative," rather than the term "fraudu-
lent."215
In SEC v. Peters,216 the Tenth Circuit noted that section 14(e)
gives the SEC a broader mandate than section 10(b) because it
specifically authorizes the SEC to "define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." '217 Further, the court ques-
tioned whether section 14(e) was intended to prohibit only
fraudulent nondisclosure, but held that even if this were the case,
Rule 14e-3 was reasonably designed to achieve that goal. In
O'Hagan, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to go this far in
upholding the defendant's conviction under Rule 14e-3. After ob-
serving that a "prophylactic measure, because its mission is to pre-
vent, typically encompasses more than the core activity prohib-
ited, ' 218 the Court found that "[s]ensibly read [Rule 14e-3] is an
exercise of the Commission's full authority. Logically and practi-
cally, such a rule may be conceived and defended, alternatively, as
definitional or preventive." 219
The legislative history of the Williams Act suggests that Con-
gress was not interested in favoring bidders or target companies in
takeovers, but instead was concerned about disclosure to investors.
Trading in anticipation of tender offers was one of the mischiefs
that Congress attempted to address in requiring investors to be in-
formed about a takeover bid before deciding to sell or hold securi-
ties in a target company.20 Permitting trading and tipping by per-
215 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2216 (1997).
216 978 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1992).
217 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
218 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2217.
219 Id. at 2218 n.19.
220 See 116 CONG. REC. 3023, 3023 (1970) (statement of Sen. Williams). For legislative
history, see generally Additional Consumer Protection in Corporate Takeovers and In-
creasing the Securities Act Exemption for Small Businessmen: Hearings on S. 336 and S.
3431 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong. (1970); Investor Protection in Corporate Takeovers-Increase in Regulation A Ex-
emption: Hearings on H.R. 4285, S. 3431 and S. 336 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Fin. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. (1970);
Takeover Bids: Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
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sons other than the bidder who know about an upcoming tender
offer, prior to the time of the public announcement, would defeat
the legislative intent in enacting the Williams Act.221
D. A Theory of Disclosure and Abstention Relationships
As the foregoing explains, contrary to popular belief, there is
no general legal rule that a public company must make prompt
disclosure of all material, corporate developments. 22  The SEC,
therefore, has adopted several investor protection strategies to en-
courage disclosure of price sensitive information. First, while a
company may be permitted to remain silent about an important
development, if it does speak, it may not make misleading state-
ments. Second, the SEC has fostered the prompt release of ma-
terial information, historically through exhortation and voluntary
corporate disclosure policies,24 but in recent years by compelling
issuers to disclose and update forward-looking information. 3
Third, and most importantly, the SEC, by developing and enforc-
ing a ban upon trading on material, undisclosed corporate infor-
mation, has tried to prevent the selective release of confidential
corporate information.
The SEC's prosecution in Texas Gulf Sulphur and the SEC's
development of the disclose or abstain doctrine with respect to
material corporate information occurred shortly after the 1964
and Fin. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., (1968).
221 See Laura Ryan, Comment, Rule 14e-3's Disclose-or-Abstain Rule and Its Validity
Under Section 14(e), 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 449 (1991).
222 See MEREDITH M. BROWN, DISCLOSURE AND THE CORPORATE ISSUER, reprinted
in 2 THE CONTINUING DISCLOSURE SYSTEM: PROBLEMS AND PARTICIPANTS (Franklin
E. Gill ed., 1991) (1988).
223 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d
1358 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Fidelity Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 18,927, 25 SEC
Docket (CCH) 1056 (July 30, 1982).
224 In a 1970 release concerning timely disclosure of material corporate developments,
the SEC stated:
Not only must material facts affecting the company's operations be re-
ported; they must also be reported promptly, Corporate releases which dis-
close.., favorable developments but do not even suggest existing adverse cor-
porate developments do not serve the public needs and may violate anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 8995
[1970-1971] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 77,915 (Oct. 15, 1970).
225 See Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1998). The duty to update prior
corporate statements is unclear. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). Compare id. with Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990).
But, the SEC has brought enforcement cases based on a corporation's failure to correct
forward-looking statements in prior MD&A disclosures. See In re Bank of Boston, Ex-
change Act Release No. 81, 60 SEC Docket (CCH) 2695 (Dec. 22, 1995).
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amendments to the Exchange Act. These amendments gave the
SEC a significantly increased mandate to regulate annual and pe-
riodic disclosure by public companies. In the author's view, the
timing of these events was not accidental. The need to police the
disclosure of such a vast universe of public companies made it nec-
essary to develop an enforcement remedy to compel such disclo-
sure. Although justifying the ban against insider trading law under
the antifraud rules may be difficult from a doctrinal and theoreti-
cal perspective, it is easier to prove the facts of an insider trading
case than to prove facts demonstrating that an issuer committed
fraud in the timing of a disclosure item. The Texas Gulf Sulphur
case involved trading on material, undisclosed corporate informa-
tion by insiders and their tippees, and a misleading press release by
the issuer. The disclose or abstain doctrine was, and still is, ancil-
lary to the SEC's primary mandate to compel prompt and honest
disclosure of information relevant to investors. Yet, it is an impor-
tant ancillary doctrine because it enables corporations to maintain
their confidential information that is uncertain or not ripe for dis-
closure, while preventing insiders from using such information for
their personal gain at the expense of public investors.
In the tender offer arena, the disclose or abstain doctrine has
likewise maintained the fairness and equity of the trading markets
until a person subject to disclosure obligations makes such disclo-
sure. The Williams Act essentially imposes on a bidder a disclo-
sure duty to target company shareholders, even though under cor-
porate law no fiduciary duty runs from the bidder to the target
company or its shareholders. The long term objective of the dis-
close or abstain doctrine is disclosure; the short term objective is to
prevent the misuse of information required to be disclosed in the
future, prior to such disclosure. Regardless of who is the source of
the information, target company shareholders will be deprived of
the informed decisionmaking opportunity as envisioned by the
Williams Act if market prices are distorted by trading by those in
the know about the tender offer.
Scalping and front running involve different disclosure obliga-
tions. In these situations, there is a conflict of interest between a
securities industry professional and either customers or traders in
the market. In some cases, a duty to the customer is breached be-
cause the customer's agent is making a secret profit. In this situa-
tion, a disclosure obligation arises under classic agency law. 26 In
226 An agent who makes a profit in connection with transactions conducted by him on
behalf of the principal is under a duty to give such profit to the principal. See
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other cases, a dealer with time and place market advantages over-
reaches other market participants. This scenario is difficult to fit
into the analysis that relates the evils of insider trading to a disclo-
sure obligation. Rather, it is more closely related to the responsi-
bilities of fair dealing that the securities laws have customarily
placed on specialists and, market makers. 27
There must be derivative liability of tippees for trading on
material, undisclosed information emanating either from a corpo-
rate or market source. One of the problems with the misappro-
priation fraud on the source doctrine is that it does not require the
source to have any disclosure obligation or other fair dealing obli-
gation to investors. However, such a requirement was articulated
in Dirks v. SEC.2 1 In Dirks, the Supreme Court took the position
that since a tippee's liability is derivative, the tipper must have a
disclose or abstain obligation. 29 Further, the Court suggested that
some outsiders become temporary insiders because they have a
relationship of trust and confidence with the source of nonpublic
information. 230
Although the Supreme Court has given the SEC a green light
to prosecute insider trading cases under the misappropriation doc-
trine, the O'Hagan decision does not provide guidance as to what
type of fact patterns-other than trading by a lawyer on confiden-
tial information misappropriated from a client bidder-will be up-
held under this theory. It would be easier to distinguish which
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 388 (1933). For the application of this principle to directors
and their fiduciary relationship to shareholders, see Brown v. Halbert, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781
(Ct. App. 1969).
227 Specialists have negative and affirmative obligations to the marketplace in assuring a
fair and orderly market. See ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, RESHAPING THE EQUITY
MARKETS 27-42 (1991). Over-the-counter market makers are less regulated on the theory
that competition constrains unfair dealing. See id. at 54-62. Recently, the SEC has en-
deavored to more aggressively police informational advantages and manipulative activity
in the over-the-counter market through enforcement action and rulemaking. See Ex-
change Act Rules llAcl-1, llAcl-4, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.11Ac-1, .llAcl-4; Exchange Act
Release No. 37,619, 62 SEC Docket (CCH) 1795 (Aug. 29, 1996); Exchange Act Release
No. 37,619A, 62 SEC Docket (CCH) 2083 (Sept. 6, 1996) (ordering execution obligations);
Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regarding the
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"),' the NASDAQ Market, and
NASDAQ Market Makers, Exchange Act Release No. 37,542, 62 SEC Docket (CCH)
1385 (Aug. 8, 1996). The SEC has begun to address the issue of how informational advan-
tages should be regulated in electronic and international marketplaces. See Regulation of
Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 85,942 (May 23,1997).
228 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
229 See id. at 659.
230 See id. at 655 n.14.
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cases should be actionable and which should not, if the misappro-
priation doctrine and other insider trading cases became more di-
rectly linked to disclosure obligations of the source of the informa-
tion. Such a theory could be enforced either by the courts in
future interpretations of Rule 10b-5 or by the SEC as a matter of
prosecutorial discretion. Some of the controversial cases previ-
ously prosecuted were not upheld under this theory, but others
might have been if the theory had been argued.
One type of fact pattern that has frustrated the courts involves
information that the source had no duty to disclose, either imme-
diately or even when the information became ripe for disclosure.
Courts have had problems with these cases because they seem to
have little to do with the fundamental disclosure obligations of the
securities laws. In United States v. Bryan,3 for example, the Lot-
tery was held to have no duty under the securities laws to disclose
to investors what companies would receive equipment contracts.
Therefore, the defendant's misappropriation of such information
for trading in the issuers' securities in advance of the contract
awards should not have been, and was not, deemed a violation of
Rule 10b-5. Nevertheless, trading by government officials on con-
fidential information may be prohibited by other laws.232 Similarly,
the case against Foster Winans in United States v. Carpenter33
should have failed because the Wall Street Journal was not subject
to a disclose or abstain obligation with respect to the contents of
its "Heard on the Street" column.234 By contrast, in United States v.
O'Hagan,235 the defendant's client had a duty, as a bidder in a ten-
der offer, to disclose its intentions to make a tender offer after
buying more than five percent of the target's stock. Therefore, the
defendant, as a tippee of that information and as a temporary in-
sider, indirectly caused the breach of a disclosure obligation.
231 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
232 See United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970). Some commentators have ar-
gued that government employees who use undisclosed information, obtained solely by
reason of their official positions, for personal benefit in the sale or purchase of a security
violate Rule 10b-5. See Herbert T. Krimmel, The Government Insider and Rule 10b-5: A
New Application for an Expanding Doctrine, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1491 (1974). But others
do not find a duty to disclose for outsiders who are not tippees. See Federal Securities
Code § 1603 cmt. 3(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
233 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affid by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
The dissenting judge in the Second Circuit expressed the view that this was not a securities
case. See id. at 1037 (Miner, C.J., dissenting).
234 Other problematic cases include United States v. Liberia, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993),
and United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), both of which supported
convictions based on the misappropriation theory.
235 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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Another questionable type of fact pattern involves a chain of
family tippees where there are no fiduciary relationships, although
the initial tipper may have owed a fiduciary duty to a source and
may have mentioned the need for confidentiality to the initial tip-
pee. Under the misappropriation theory, the courts have some-
times upheld and sometimes dismissed these cases.2 36  In some
cases, personal, not family, relationships were involved. 7
Whether a family or other non-fiduciary personal relationship will
suffice for liability under O'Hagan remains to be seen. Further, a
distinction could be drawn between a failure to disclose informa-
tion about a merger, which could be prosecuted only under Rule
10b-5, and information about a tender offer, which could be prose-
cuted also under Rule 14e-3 and, thus, would not require proof of
breach of a fiduciary duty. This is illogical.
A better rule would be that whenever a public company offi-
cer or director, or a bidder or target, tips anyone about material,
nonpublic information and the tippee knows that the information
is confidential, trading by the tippee or (if there is knowledge of
the information's confidentiality) the tippee's tippees should be
illegal. However, legal culpability should be dependent upon a
relation back to the source's disclosure obligation, whether the
source is a public company, a bidder, or a target. A connection to
the disclose or abstain obligation can be found in the tender offer
context whether the source is a bidder or target, despite the fact
that disclosure obligations under the Williams Act are primarily
placed on the bidder, since a target company is required to advise
its shareholders of the board of directors' views concerning a ten-
der offer and also has fiduciary obligations to its shareholders un-
der state law?8
The law today regarding remote tippees-at least in non-
tender offer cases-requires proof of a breach of fiduciary duty by
an initial tipper in order for trading by second or third tier tippees
to be related back to that breach. 39 But, what about the cases
236 Compare United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d. Cir. 1991) (en banc), and
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985), with
SEC v. Moran, 922 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
237 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (case in which one defen-
dant was the roommate of the reporter). In SEC v. Thayer, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,607 (1984), a "personal relationship" was involved.
238 The need for both the offeror and target to disclose or abstain in order to eliminate
unfair trading in advance of an announcement of a tender offer is an argument for regu-
lating such "outsider" trading apart from Rule 10b-5 under Rule 14e-3.
239 See United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., 785 F. Supp. 1137, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 138 (2d Cir.
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where a trader, lawfully or inadvertently, comes into the posses-
sion of inside information? In SEC v. Lund,240 the defendant came
into possession of inside information through a business negotia-
tion. In SEC v. Switzer,241 the defendant overheard a lawful busi-
ness conversation at a sporting event. In SEC v. Willis, 2 2 a psy-
chiatrist found out about material, nonpublic information from a
patient and then traded on it. Only the Willis case could be argued
under the misappropriation theory.
A better analysis would inquire first whether the source of the
information had a disclosure obligation, and then whether the
trader knew that the information was confidential and material,
and thus subject to public disclosure before it could be traded
upon. Since the purpose of prosecution is to enforce the disclosure
obligations of securities markets participants, it would be reason-
able to further limit liability, at least for criminal cases, to situa-
tions where a fiduciary, family, employment, or other confidential
relationship exists between the source and the tippee or the first
tier and later tier tippees. If an outside trader has neither a per-
sonal nor derivative disclosure obligation, mere possession of in-
sider information should not prevent him from trading. What has
made it so difficult to formulate a clear rule based on disclosure
obligations is the Supreme Court's refusal to find that a trader on
insider information breaches a duty to contemporaneous traders
and the SEC's refusal to be constrained by any theories that might
limit liability even in borderline cases. Yet, as one commentator
has observed, "final resolution of the controversy surrounding in-
sider trading awaits a coherent policy rationale that would simul-
taneously support and limit insider trading liability." 243
E. SEC Policies Regarding Silence
A good question is why does the SEC devote so many re-
sources to insider trading cases instead of developing policies to
compel the more rapid release of material information by issuers
and securities market professionals? The 1969 Wheat Report
pointed out that "[t]here is growing recognition in the investment
community of the need for prompt, current reporting by publicly-
1990).
240 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
241 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
242 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
243 Jonathan E.A. ten Oever, Insider Trading and the Dual Role of Information, 106
YALE L.J. 1325 (1997).
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held corporations of material changes in their affairs." 244 Yet, the
Wheat Report acknowledged that continuing disclosure obliga-
tions arise more from stock exchange listing requirements than
from the Exchange Act. Therefore, it was recommended that
public companies be required to include quarterly reports in their
SEC filings. The Wheat Report also acknowledged the need for
the SEC to "balance the requirements... considered essential for,,
meaningful current reports against the time to be allowed for filing
them."2 4 Nevertheless, the Wheat Report recognized that SEC
filings were merely a "backstop" for stock exchange disclosure
policies and that, in keeping the marketplace informed, news re-
ports and the efforts of research analysts in ferreting out and dis-
seminating information were of greater importance.2"
These insights have been reiterated and updated in the Wall-
man Report which recommends that a system of company registra-
tion replace the current system of transactional registration. One
objective of the new system would be to improve the quality, in-
tegrity, and reliability of a registered company's disclosure on an
ongoing basis to a level comparable to that which is traditionally
provided in primary offerings.247 This goal would be achieved in a
variety of ways, including enhancements to Form 8-K to mandate
disclosure of additional material developments, some of which are
currently required to be reported in Form 10-Q.248 Significantly,
the Wallman Report recommends that the period within which a
Form 8-K must be filed accelerated from fifteen calendar days to
five business days.249
Even if the recommendations of the Wallman Report are
adopted, gaps in the continuous disclosure system will remain,
making the continuing ban on trading on inside information neces-
sary. This linkage between improving disclosure and prohibiting
insider trading was recognized in the Wheat Report, which ob-
served that:
244 FRANCIS M. WHEAT, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SEC FROM THE DISCLOSURE POLICY STUDY 331 (1969)
[hereinafter WHEAT REPORT].
245 Id. at 332.
246 See id.
247 WALLMAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 202, at 10, 21.
248 See id. at 30. The recommended enhancements are material modifications to the
rights of securities holders, resignation or removal of any top five executive officers, de-
faults of senior securities, sales of a significant percentage of a company's stock, and cer-
tain advice from the issuer's auditors.
249 See id.
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publicly-owned corporations have come under increasing obli-
gations and incentives to make timely disclosure of information
which might materially affect the market for their securities.
These developments include both the expanded policy on
timely disclosure adopted by the major stock exchanges and the
principle with respect to "insider trading" developed in Texas
Gulf and other cases.250
An interesting issue left open by O'Hagan is the legality of
trading on corporate disclosure other than that made in SEC fil-
ings. The current practice by public companies of releasing mate-
rial information in multi-party telephone calls with analysts does
not contravene the misappropriation theory, yet it nevertheless
raises real questions. In an era when companies can make elec-
tronic disclosure through the EDGAR system and this information
can be accessed by anyone with a computer modem, why should
public disclosure be made via financial intermediaries, thus favor-
ing institutional over public investors? There may be sound rea-
sons for this customary practice, but since the SEC has developed
its insider trading policies through ad hoc enforcement cases, it is
not clear exactly what policies the SEC is fostering. Some pending
insider trading cases may address this issue but none involve issuer
disclosures to analysts. They do, however, involve the question of
when material information becomes "public" in today's market-
place.251
The SEC's longstanding reluctance to mandate the prompt
disclosure of all material information by public companies can be
explained in a number of ways. First, the SEC and the courts have
respected an issuer's need to keep information confidential either
to serve a corporate purpose or to keep facts confidential until ripe
for disclosure. 25 2 Second, the SEC has relied upon financial ana-
lysts to ferret out, sift through, and form conclusions about mate-
rial facts.2 3 The reluctance of both the SEC and the courts to in-
250 WHEAT REPORT, supra note 245, at 133.
251 See United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1996) cert. denied sub nom. Cusi-
mano v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2509 (1997); SEC v. Lenfest, 949 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa.
1996). The telephone conference call between issuers and analysts has begun to trouble
the SEC. See Floyd Norris, In Search of a More Democratic Grapevine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
3, 1998, at D1.
252 See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir. 1973); Elkind v. Liggett & Myer, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re
Carnation Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, 33 SEC Docket (CCH) 884
(July 8, 1985). The premature release of information could mislead investors and expose
issuers to liability. See Norman S. Poser, Chinese Walls in the U.S. and the U.K., 21 REV.
SEC. & COMM. REG. 207,217 (1988).
253 See In re Investors Management Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267, [1970-1971
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hibit the investigative work of analysts is a factor that has made
defining insider trading difficult. 54 Third, the SEC is a prosecuto-
rial agency that has long articulated the view that detailed regula-
tions will be a blueprint for fraud and therefore it is better to rely
upon general antifraud concepts to police the securities markets.25 5
It can be argued that the SEC's solicitude towards securities
analysts is an example of agency capture and that this concern for
the role analysts play in disseminating corporate information to
the marketplace has kept the SEC from imposing more stringent
obligations on public companies to disclose material facts
promptly.256 There are at least two responses to this criticism.
First, even a populist securities regulator like William 0. Douglas
was skeptical of the ability of the ordinary individual investor to
analyze complex financial information and believed that such in-
formation needed to be analyzed by professionals to give the secu-
rities markets integrity. 257 Second, assuming ongoing disclosure of
all material information on a real time basis is practicable, it is un-
likely that in 1934, 1964, or today the SEC would be given the kind
of power over public companies needed to compel such disclo-
sure 58 Recently, the SEC has threatened to take action against
analysts who trade on, or selectively disclose, corporate informa-
tion immediately before a news release, but it is unclear whether
such conduct involves any breach of a fiduciary duty under Rule
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,163 (July 29, 1971); Loomis on Inside In-
formation, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1972, at 20.
254 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983).
255 For elaboration on the idea that SEC enforcement thrives on the absence of stan-
dards, see ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 95-98, 193-202, 227-29
(1982).
256 The theory of agency capture is that there are built-in tendencies toward ultimate
domination of an agency and the regulatory process by regulated industry. See EDWARD
S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 181 (1981).
257 See William O. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521,523-24 (1934).
258 SEC power over public companies has generally been indirect and has been added
to only by accretion as a result of various scandals. For example, the sensitive payments
scandals of the 1970s led to the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which gave
the SEC direct authority regarding accounting systems and controls of public companies.
The insider trading scandals of the next decade led to the SEC power to bar persons as
officers and directors, but only in court, not SEC administrative proceedings. Fiduciary
duties of directors to shareholders remain a matter of state, rather than federal, law. See
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977). Whether Congress would even be
willing to enact a system of company registration as envisioned by the Wallman Commis-
sion Report, as opposed to a system of securities registration, thus giving the SEC direct,
rather than indirect, power over regulated corporations is an interesting question not ad-
dressed in the Wallman Commission Report.
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10b-5 violation.25 9
Both the SEC and the courts also have demonstrated a solici-
tude for bidders in takeovers that has inhibited more stringent
regulation that would accelerate their notification of an intention
to commence a tender offer. The basic policy of the Williams Act
is to promote neutrality between bidders and target companies in
takeovers, and the focus of SEC concern is investor protection.
26 0
This neutrality to some extent fosters takeovers, however, and the
SEC has opposed measures that would tilt federal policy against
takeovers. Although the SEC did make efforts to close the ten day
window of section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, it did so in the con-
text of opposition to proposed legislation designed to thwart hos-
tile takeovers and this effort was therefore unsuccessful. -
In 1980 the then Chairman of the SEC recommended to Con-
gress significant changes to the Williams Act, which among other
things, would have required shareholders owning more than five
percent of a reporting company's shares to: make a public an-
nouncement within one business day after reaching the five per-
cent level; file a Schedule 13D within five business days thereafter;
and refrain from making further acquisitions until two business
days after the filing. 61 The 1983 Report of the Blue Ribbon Advi-
sory Committee on Tender Offers ("Advisory Committee") found
that because of the ten-day window between the acquisition of
more than a five percent interest and the required filing of a
Schedule 13D, the requirement to report the acquisition of more
than five percent of an outstanding class of an issuer's equity secu-
rities had failed to give notice of potential changes in control.262
The Advisory Committee found this window to present a substan-
tial opportunity for abuse, so it recommended that no person be
permitted to acquire ownership of more than five percent of an
259 See Paul Beckett & Rebecca Buckman, SEC's Levitt Warns Analysts on Some
Trades, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1998 at All.
260 The Williams Act is comprised of sections 13(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(e) (1994), and the various SEC rules thereunder. In the words of
the Supreme Court, a major aspect of this legislation "to protect the investor was to avoid
favoring either management or the takeover bidder." Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
633 (1982).
261 See Letter from Harold M. Williams, Chairman, SEC, to the Senate Banking Com-
mittee (Feb. 15, 1980) (on file with author). See James H. Fogelson et al., Changing the
Takeover Game: The SEC's Proposed Amendments to the Williams Act, 17 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 409 (1980).
262 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, SEC, REPORT OF
RECOMMENDATIONS (July 8,1983), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1028 (Extra
Edition) 21-22.
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outstanding class until such person has filed a Schedule 13D and it
has been on file with the SEC for forty-eight hours.263
The SEC's 1980 recommendation and the Advisory Commit-
tee's variation would have protected shareholders in target com-
panies from selling shares to those with information of an upcom-
ing change of control bid. The SEC's own legislative package,
which followed the Advisory Committee's Report, recommended
closing the ten day window,2 6 a recommendation which was also
included in the Tender Offer Report Act of 1984, a bill approved
by the House Energy and Commerce Committee.265 However, this
bill contained a variety of anti-bidder provisions, requiring, for ex-
ample, a tender offer be kept open for forty days rather than
twenty, and the issuance of a community impact statement. These
provisions were accordingly criticized by the Reagan White House
and the SEC, and as a result the bill died. 266 Further, in the fol-
lowing year, the SEC dealt an even greater blow to tender offer re-
form when it withdrew support from its own legislative proposal,
stating it would support a bill narrowing the ten day window and
nothing more.267
In 1987 despite the SEC's general opposition to pending take-
over legislation, it continued to support measures requiring more
timely disclosure of substantial acquisitions under section 13(d) of
the Exchange Act. Specifically, it recommended that any person
acquiring more than five percent of a class of equity securities be
required to disclose that acquisition within five business days and
that the purchaser be prohibited from making additional acquisi-
tions until the disclosure is made.268 The SEC's rationale for this
proposal was that it would promote prompt disclosure without un-
duly inhibiting the ability of market participants to trade freely.269
There was no mention of curbing insider trading in the tender of-
fer arena.
The insider trading scandals of the time were a backdrop to
the proposed tender offer legislation of the 1980s. An address by
263 See id. at 22.
264 See Letter from John S.R. Shad, Chairman, SEC, to Congressman Timothy E.
Wirth, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,630 (May 21, 1984).
265 H.R. 5693, 98th Cong. (1984).
266 See The Battle over Tender Offer Reform: From the States and the Courts to Con-
gress, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 60, 61 (Jan. 15, 1988).
267 See id.
268 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce Concerning Pending Legislation Regarding Contests for Corporate
Control, 100th Cong. 2 (1987) (statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman, SEC).
269 See id. at 14.
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then Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest criticized as misguided
the takeover critics who were linking insider trading with hostile
takeovers.270 In speaking out against anti-takeover legislation, he
also attacked the "easy but illogical arguments that seek to prevent
insider trading by stopping takeovers." 271 Commissioner Grund-
fest was correct in arguing that "[i]nsider trading is not caused by
hostile takeovers, nor is it uniquely associated with hostile take-
overs."272 Nevertheless, narrowing or closing the ten-day window
would clearly have had a prophylactic effect of curbing some in-
sider trading in advance of a tender offer announcement. The
SEC can be criticized for failing to pursue this legislative initiative
more aggressively before and after Congress abandoned takeover
reform legislation. 3  Moreover, the SEC's policies are illogical
since a bidder can make purchases up to five percent of an issuer's
securities without disclosure, and can continue to purchase securi-
ties in secret for ten days-or up until the time a tender offer is
announced-but a bidder's tippee cannot buy securities in advance
of a public announcement of a tender offer.
The SEC's reluctance to inhibit takeovers or interfere with
merger negotiations led to its decision in Carnation Co.,274 which
permitted companies engaged in merger or takeover negotiations
to remain silent about such discussions by refusing to comment on
market rumors. Although the stock exchanges have elaborate
policies mandating continuous disclosure and prohibiting selective
disclosure, 271 where it is possible for a corporation to keep informa-
tion confidential, premature public disclosure of material informa-
tion may properly be avoided.2 76 The Carnation decision provides
issuers with a mechanism for avoiding disclosure of fluid or uncer-
tain information but also creates a disclosure gap that could be
misused if there was no ban against insider trading.
270 JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST, SEC, POLITICS AND TAKEOVERS: A BRIEF WASHINGTON
PERSPECTIVE (National Bureau of Econ. Research Panel on the Economic Effects of
Mergers and Acquisitions, 1987).
271 Id. at 3.
272 Id. at 4.
273 After CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), the decision up-
holding as constitutional an anti-takeover state statute, federal takeover reform became
bogged down in debates about federal preemption. As a result, the business community
became unenthusiastic about federal legislation. While it can be argued that the SEC was
a captive of the securities industry with regard to these issues, the SEC was relegated to
the sidelines in any event, since most of the action was occurring in Congress.
274 In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, 33 SEC Docket (CCH) 874
(July 8,1985).
275 See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual (NYSE) § 202 (1997).
276 See id. § 202.01.
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The SEC extensively relied upon the insider trading doctrine
in taking enforcement action against manipulative activity that re-
sulted from the excesses of the market for corporate control that
was fueled by the junk bond financing of the 1980s.277 In part, this
was because manipulation in this context is extremely difficult to
prove under existing statutory norms.278 It was easier to prosecute
Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, and their cohorts on insider trading
charges than on other theories. The SEC could have ameliorated
the evils of tender offers in the 1980s through regulation, but the
agency was ideologically committed to fostering a market for cor-
porate control. Accordingly, it selected the ban on insider trading
as a weapon to attack those miscreants that the SEC believed
should be chased out of the securities industry. 279
In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court elliptically casted doubt on
the use of Rule 14e-3 to prohibit warehousing, the practice by a
bidder of suggesting to other traders that they might purchase
stock of a company that the bidder is (secretly or more openly)
prospecting as a takeover target .2  This type of manipulative ac-
tivity was prevalent in the 1980s when a loose confederation of
market players put target companies in play.281 The Supreme
Court may be troubled by Schreiber's limiting interpretation of
"manipulative" as opposed to O'Hagan's expansive interpretation
of "fraudulent." 282
With regard to outsider trading on confidential information
concerning impending market transactions other than takeovers,
the SEC has preferred to rely on its authority to regulate broker-
dealers, especially specialists and market makers, rather than to
rely on insider trading prohibitions to make the markets fairer.2 3
In addition, the SEC has relied on the just and equitable principles
of the self-regulatory organizations in situations involving over-
reaching by market participants with superior information. 28 4 In
this area, the SEC has been concerned about undermining market
277 See James B. Stewart & Daniel Hertzberg, SEC Accuses Drexel of a Sweeping Array
of Securities Violations, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1988, at Al.
278 See United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991).
279 See generally STEWART, supra note 141.
280 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2217 n.17 (1997).
281 If the confederates became a "group," a section 13(d) filing was required.
282 See supra text accompanying notes 214-15. Further development of this topic is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
283 See, e.g., SEC Rules llAcl-1, 1lAcl-4; 17 C.F.R. 240.11Acl-1, 1lAcl-4 (1998) (quote
and order exposure rules).
284 See, e.g., In re E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303 (July 6,1988).
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liquidity, just as it has been concerned about discouraging research
analysis or takeovers by too heavy handed an insistence on disclo-
sure of information that might be premature and make the securi-
ties markets less efficient and less fair rather than more efficient
and more fair. Regulating the informational advantages of various
market participants is an important challenge for the SEC, but it is
too complicated and delicate a task for a broad brush insider
trading rule like Rule 10b-5. The SEC has ample authority under
its national market system mandate and even section 15(c) of the
Exchange Act to deal with these problems.285
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the ban against trading on inside
information should be justified in terms of the SEC's mandate to
compel the disclosure of material, market information, especially
by corporations, and others participating in tender offers. Al-
though a corporate official's tippee might not owe any duty to the
shareholders of the corporation, officials who give such persons
material, nonpublic information generally do owe such a duty. Al-
though a prospective bidder's tippee may not owe a duty to share-
holders of the target company, the bidder is under an obligation to
make certain disclosures before a tender offer can go forward. So
is a target. Where securities industry participants have unfair in-
formational advantages, the SEC generally can equalize trading
advantages through its ample rulemaking power with regard to
market structure. Accordingly, an all encompassing theory, which
would include scalping, front running, and similar types of outsider
trading, is not necessary.
Although the doctrine of equal access to information has been
partially rejected by the Supreme Court, fairness is still at the bot-
tom of the insider trading ban. The Cady, Roberts formulation
concerning the unfairness of using confidential information for
personal advantage remains valid. Perhaps this is too vague a
standard upon which to predicate criminal prosecutions. How-
ever, where one party to a securities transaction has obtained an
asymmetrical information advantage over another party, not
through diligent research or similar efforts, but through nefarious
means, a buyer from, or seller to, such a person would justifiably
perceive such trading to be unfair. Further, where information
285 See supra note 228. O'Hagan analogizes the SEC's prophylactic authority under sec-
tion 14(e) to that under section 15(c). See 117 S. Ct. at 2217.
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about a security is hidden from the market, the pricing of that se-
curity is manipulative and deceptive. The misappropriation and
property rights theories are both too narrow to encompass all of
the insider trading cases and, while useful in some contexts, are
problematic in that they are based upon the suppression of infor-
mation rather than its dissemination.
The argument that the ban on insider trading is necessary to
enforce the mandatory disclosure provisions of the securities laws
seems self-evident. Surprisingly, however, the SEC, the courts,
and the commentators seem to have become so bogged down in
the details of the misappropriation theory, as well as other theo-
ries, that they have overlooked a basic rationale for prohibiting in-
sider trading. In a marketplace where information is ever more
accessible with ever fewer time delays, it is important for the SEC
to go back to basics on this issue so, to the extent feasible, regula-
tory policies can focus on preventing insider trading by compelling
more prompt disclosure of material information by public compa-
nies, bidders, and market participants with informational advan-
tages. Hopefully, if the SEC and the courts focus their attentions
on the relationship between disclosure policy and the ban against
trading on inside information, the parameters of this crime, under
sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act, will be easier to de-
lineate.
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